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Kimberly Hutton Honaker 
Allegations of tax abuse at Enron, WorldCom, and others generated 
scrutiny from regulators, public markets, and the media. In response, accounting 
researchers have sought to understand factors that drive corporate tax avoidance. 
While historical research has focused on firm characteristics, little emphasis has 
been placed on the executive who develops corporate tax strategy.  
This study addresses this issue by considering how the internal tax 
function (ITF) and in-house tax expertise influence tax avoidance. I examine the 
association between tax avoidance, denoted BOOK_ETR, which is measured as 
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles effective tax rate, and (1) the 
existence of an ITF, (2) background characteristics of the chief tax officer (or in-
house tax expert (IHTE)), and (3) the existence of accounting, tax, or legal audit 
committee (AC) expertise.  
In an analysis of 1,400 firm-year observations, I find that an ITF is 
associated with lower BOOK_ETRs. This relationship is especially pronounced in 
firms that are smaller, less profitable, have foreign operations, or do not use 
  
 
   
vii 
their auditor for tax services. Additionally, I find that AC legal expertise is associated 
with higher BOOK_ ETR.  
In an analysis of IHTE characteristics, I find that an IHTE who is a certified 
attorney is positively related to BOOK_ETR and, therefore, engages in less tax 
avoidance. However, an IHTE with international experience, prior employment with the 
firm’s auditor, or longer tenure with his or her current employer is negatively associated 
with BOOK_ETR. IHTE certification, gender, and overall years of experience are not 
associated with BOOK_ETR. 
Finally, I find that the respective relationships between BOOK_ETR and an ITF 
or IHTE characteristics are moderated by certain types of AC expertise. Specifically, I 
find that an ITF is not associated with lower BOOK_ETR when an AC member has 
either tax or accounting expertise. I also find that attorney certification is significantly 
and positively associated with BOOK_ETR only in the presence of AC accounting 
expertise. Finally, I find that a Certified Public Accountant designation, Masters in 
Accounting, and Masters in Business Administration are only significant in the presence 
of AC tax, legal, and tax or legal expertise, respectively. 
 
Keywords: tax avoidance, tax aggressiveness, tax executive, tax expert, accounting 
expert, legal expert, audit committee, upper echelon theory  
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Questionable tax practices have again surfaced as an issue facing corporate 
America (e.g., Forelle & Bryan-Low, 2013; Linebaugh, Thurm, & Lessin, 2013; "The 
morning risk report: Tax havens lose their veneer," 2013; Yadron, Linebaugh, & Lessin, 
2013) and have been inextricably linked to notable accounting scandals of the past 
decade. As fraudulent accounting practices at Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and others were 
brought to light, these companies were also criticized for their aggressive tax strategies 
(Duska, 2004). Tax strategies saving millions of dollars in taxes payable to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) attracted criticism from academics, regulators, and the public 
press (Beale, 2004) and inspired proposals to close tax sheltering loopholes (Mazerov, 
2007). Concerns over abusive tax practices did not begin with these scandals. The 
questionable use of tax shelters has been noted as far back as the 1970s.
1
 Data from 
Graham and Tucker (2006) indicates that the number of tax shelter cases increased 
throughout subsequent decades. Abusive tax practices have prompted litigation against 
corporate senior management including CEOs, CFOs, tax executives, and other 
accounting personnel (Brickey, 2003), with accounting firms also serving as primary 
targets of this litigation (e.g., Johnson, 2005; Johnston, 2002).  
                                                 
1
 See Graham and Tucker (2006) and Wilson (2009) for specific examples of tax shelter 





For example, in 1990, Ernst and Young was ordered to pay $18.9 million in 
damages to a group of tax shelter investors
2
 who relied on fraudulent financial forecasts 
reviewed by the accounting firm (Cowan, 1990). In 2002, PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
agreed to pay an undisclosed but “substantial” penalty to the IRS for failing to comply 
with disclosure rules related to their marketing of tax shelters to clients (Johnston, 2002).
3
 
In one of the more significant tax shelter settlements, KPMG agreed to pay 
approximately $450 million to settle a U.S. investigation of their sale of fraudulent tax 
shelters (Johnson, 2005).   
To curb abusive tax behaviors, regulations initiated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX) (2002) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
(2005) limit non-audit services (NAS) provided by the auditor. The PCAOB (2005) is 
concerned that tax NAS not banned by SOX remain a threat to the auditor’s 
independence and lead to abusive tax strategies. The PCAOB rules were established, in 
part, to address concerns over audit firm practices of providing tax shelter opportunities 
to (1) corporate audit clients and (2) individual executives at those clients (Allen, 2007). 
Many clients have since shifted to other tax service providers (Maydew & Shackelford, 
2005), which may include other public accounting firms, law firms, and in-house 
corporate tax staff (e.g., Mills, Erickson, & Maydew, 1998; Neuman, Omer, & 
Thompson, 2011).  
                                                 
2
 These investors, who were part of a class-action lawsuit against Ernst and Young (E&Y), 
purchased interests in limited partnerships formed and marketed by FP Investments, an E&Y client. 
Specific investor details, including whether or not they were clients of E&Y or Coopers and Lybrand, FP 
Investments’ former auditor, were not provided. 
3
 The IRS requires tax shelter providers to maintain and disclose a list of these tax shelters and the 
clients who use them. See Reg. Sec. 301.6111-1T for complete details on these tax shelter registration 





While some anecdotal evidence suggests that SOX and other regulatory measures 
have created a drain on internal tax department resources at public companies (e.g., 
Frieswick, 2005; Snowdon, 2008), minimal empirical research documents the relative use 
of internal and external tax resources. In a pre-SOX analysis, Mills et al. (1998) report 
that approximately 72% of corporate tax planning expenditures are spent on internal 
resources, with 28% spent on outside consultants.
4
 Maydew and Shackleford (2005) 
document a dramatic shift between auditor-provided NAS and the purchase of these 
services from other accounting firms following regulation from SOX, the SEC, and the 
PCAOB,
5
 but do not evaluate the impact of regulation on internal tax department 
resources. Neuman et al. (2011) report that 65% of non-profit organizations use their 
auditor to prepare tax returns, while 21% prepare returns internally and 13% use a service 
provider other than the auditor. Additionally, Neuman et al.’s (2011) data for public 
companies indicates that approximately 68% of their sample uses the external auditor for 
some tax services, but they do not consider whether these services are supplemented by 
other external or internal service providers, or how firms that do not use their auditors 
obtain tax services.  
The shift away from the audit firm, as documented by Maydew and Shackleford 
(2005), may address the auditor independence problem noted by the PCAOB but may 
still permit aggressive tax strategies developed by internal tax resources or by outside 
consultants other than the audit firm. Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall (2012) recognize 
this issue and examine tax return preparer choices across a sample of companies from 
                                                 
4
 Mills et al. (1998) do not distinguish between the external audit firm and other external service 
providers. 
5
 In an analysis of 248 Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms, Maydew and Shackleford (2005) 
report that the mean (median) fee for auditor-provided tax NAS declined from $3.2 ($1.5) million in 2001 





Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1500. Using data merged from the IRS and Compustat, they 
report that approximately 55% of their sample (843 out of 1,533 companies) internally 
prepares corporate tax returns, while 20% use their audit firm for return preparation and 
25% use an accounting firm that is not their auditor. Klassen et al. (2012) further report 
that these preparer choices influence the aggressiveness of the tax returns filed, noting 
that returns prepared by the audit firm yielded lower income tax reserves than returns 
prepared internally or by other external consultants. However, the researchers do not 
distinguish between companies that must rely entirely on external resources due to the 
absence of an internal tax function versus those that choose to supplement internal 
resources with external return preparation.  
Tax and accounting scandals like those noted above also heightened awareness 
around the specific disclosure of aggressive tax strategies to corporate stakeholders and 
motivated the Financial Accounting Standards Board to introduce Financial Accounting 
Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) (2006). The pronouncement mandated a new approach to 
accounting for uncertain income tax benefits in accordance with Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards 109 (FAS 109) (1992).
6
 FIN 48 was designed to increase 
conformity across companies and reduce management’s discretion in accounting for 
income tax contingencies. 
The IRS extended such disclosures by introducing corporate return requirements 
to be phased in over a five year period beginning in 2010. The information return 
Schedule UTP (2010) requires considerably more detail on uncertain positions taken by 
the taxpayer than is currently required for financial reporting purposes under FIN48. The 
form is designed to provide the IRS with more complete information on a firm’s 
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interpretive tax positions, thereby minimizing the amount of time the agency spends 
identifying potential taxpayer issues (2010). 
These financial reporting and tax return compliance requirements are designed to 
create transparency between companies and their stakeholders and to hold executives 
more accountable for the decisions they make. The regulatory actions noted here clearly 
highlight the relevant role that corporate executives and their advisers play in developing, 
executing, and disclosing corporate accounting and tax strategies. Despite the 
involvement of corporate executives in tax avoidance and the recent shift toward greater 
emphasis on in-house tax service providers, little empirical research has explored the 
individuals behind these tax decisions.  
This study fills this gap in the literature and informs regulators and policymakers 
by exploring the association between the in-house tax function and corporate tax 
avoidance. As background for this analysis, consider the following details of individual 
and corporate involvement in widely publicized tax fraud cases:  
 WorldCom used income tax and other accruals to manipulate its earnings and 
effective tax rate (Beresford, Katzenbach, & Rogers Jr, 2003), but WorldCom’s 
General Tax Counsel did not face charges in the company’s fraud case.
7
 In 
addition to these illegal accounting practices, the company used a royalty-based 
tax saving strategy developed by KPMG to legally save millions of dollars in state 
taxes (Weil, 2004). 
 Congressional and regulatory investigations of Enron’s business practices 
highlighted their use of tax shelters. One report estimates that the company’s use 
of tax shelters enabled it to report financial profits of over $2 billion during a 
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three year period while reporting corresponding tax losses of $3 billion during 
that same period (Beale, 2004; Smith, 2003). Two high ranking tax officials, the 
Vice President/General Tax Counsel and Vice President of the Structured 
Transactions Group, were not prosecuted on any tax or accounting related charges 
(Brickey, 2003). 
 At the time Tyco’s fraud was discovered, the company employed a variety of 
legal tax planning strategies involving the use of off-shore subsidiaries in low tax 
jurisdictions (Symonds & Smith, 2002). The company also engaged in an 
unrelated series of transactions designed to reduce state taxes. Tyco’s Vice 
President of Tax was convicted of corporate tax evasion for failing to report $170 
million in federal capital gains related to these state tax saving strategies ("Former 
Tyco tax man gets three years," November 30, 2006).  
 Dynegy was required to restate cash flows and income tax expense after failing to 
follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) requirements to 
maintain tax benefits associated with a corporate strategy (SEC, 2003). Two 
senior level tax executives, the Vice President of Tax and Senior Director of 
International Planning, were sentenced for their involvement in the company’s 
fraud activity (Podgor, 2010), while the CEO and CFO did not face charges 
(Brickey, 2003).  
 The Senior Vice President of Tax for HealthSouth pled guilty to charges of 
falsifying federal and state tax returns. The charges stemmed from his decision to 
provide tax officials with false information to support assets and earnings 





financial statements were restated upon discovery of HealthSouth’s fraud, which 
enabled the company to later recover its overpaid taxes (See United States 
Department of Justice report (2003) for additional details). 
These five examples of corporate fraud provide a varied perspective on a chief tax 
officer’s involvement in income tax reporting for both financial accounting and tax return 
filing purposes. While tax executives at Enron and WorldCom pushed limits on the use of 
legal tax sheltering practices, the executives maintained some distance from their 
company’s fraudulent activity and were not implicated in criminal fraud proceedings 
(Brickey, 2003). On the other hand, tax executives at Dynegy and Tyco committed illegal 
acts to reduce taxes payable and increase company earnings. The tax executives at 
Dynegy had greater control of tax reporting activity such that the CFO and CEO were not 
implicated in the wrong-doing. Only a lower level accounting executive was charged 
alongside the tax executives (Brickey, 2003). The vice president of tax at HealthSouth 
abandoned his fiduciary responsibility to effectively manage his company’s income tax 
position and cash taxes paid, willingly overstating the company’s income tax liability in 
an effort to hide the company’s fraudulent activity. 
Such incidences raise an interesting question about why in-house tax experts 
reach different professional judgments relating to their firms’ income tax positions. Enofe 
(2010) points to a lack of “integrity” and “character” (p. 53) and management’s 
willingness to engage in “deceit and fraud” (p. 54) as an explanation for various 
accounting scandals that include tax accounting. However, not all tax positions taken by 
tax executives are considered abusive, nor do they regularly result in legal action or 





characteristics of tax executives and tax-related strategy and reporting decisions. To the 
best of my knowledge, research specifically on tax executives, the executive directly in-
charge and responsible for devising tax strategies and overseeing income tax compliance 
and reporting, is lacking in the literature (see also Hanlon and Heitzman’s 2010 review of 
tax-related literature). Limited emerging research examines the association between 
management such as the CEO and CFO and tax avoidance, but the anecdotes above 
suggest the CEO and CFO may not be deemed responsible for their company’s tax 
reporting behavior. 
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010) were the first among a limited number of 
tax researchers to explore manager-specific effects by tracking how the movement of 
CEOs and CFOs across companies influences tax avoidance patterns at those companies. 
Other researchers have followed this lead by exploring the influence that board interlocks 
(Brown & Drake, 2011), personally aggressive corporate managers (as defined through 
stock exercise activity of those managers) (Chyz, 2011), and managers’ political 
affiliations (Christensen & Dhaliwal, 2011) have on tax avoidance. While these studies 
consider the influence of corporate leadership over tax strategy decisions, none of them 
focus on tax leadership or consider the executive directly in charge of a company’s tax 
function. To date, only three archival studies consider the in-house tax function.
8
 
Robinson, Sykes, and Weaver (2010) find that firms evaluating their tax departments as 
profit centers have lower ETRs than those evaluating their tax departments as cost 
centers. Armstrong, Blouin, and Larker (2011) report some evidence of an association 
between tax avoidance and the level of incentive compensation paid to the tax executive 
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 Cleaveland et al. (2010) survey tax executives and report that professional certification is 
negatively related to self-reported perceived levels of corporate tax aggressiveness. See footnote 15 for 





within the tax function. Klassen et al. (2012) find that corporate tax returns prepared 
internally tend to report more aggressive positions than those tax returns prepared by an 
external consultant. 
This study extends this line of tax research and responds to the call by Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) to expand the “‘manager effect’ concept of Dyreng et al. (2010) to other 
areas” (p. 146). Specifically, this study examines the association between in-house tax 
expertise and tax avoidance practices, and utilizes aspects of upper echelon theory, which 
suggests that “organizational outcomes…are partially predicted by managerial 
background characteristics” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984, p. 193). Unlike research that 
precedes it, this research focuses specifically on the primary tax decision maker, typically 
a vice president or director of tax within the firm, the in-house tax expert (IHTE). The 
study also compares the tax avoidance behavior of companies with an internal tax 
function (ITF) to those that do not have an ITF. 
Because research on corporate tax executives is limited, I leverage prior upper 
echelon literature related to corporate executives in general and research specific to 
financial, accounting, and tax experts. Drawing from this body of knowledge, I 
hypothesize that personal and professional characteristics of the tax executive will be 
related to the level of tax aggressiveness of the firm. Such characteristics include gender, 
experience, educational background, and professional certification.  
I extend this investigation of the association between an ITF and corporate tax 
avoidance by considering the moderating role of the expertise of the audit committee. 
This moderating influence is important given the audit committee’s responsibility for 





encompass the tax function and the approval of tax services provided by the auditor. The 
tax scandals highlighted above underscore the important role tax advisors play in 
devising tax saving strategies. For purposes of this research question, I also consider the 
combined influence of the background characteristics of the IHTE and the existence of 
accounting, legal, and tax expertise within the audit committee. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I discuss the 
prior literature and develop the hypotheses. I describe the research method in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss data analysis and present the results. The final chapter, Chapter 5, 
summarizes the study, concludes, and identifies limitations and future research 
opportunities.   
  
   
11 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Tax Avoidance and Agency Issues 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) broadly define tax avoidance as a “reduction of 
explicit taxes” (p.137) which can range from legal tax saving strategies at one end of the 
spectrum to non-compliant tax evasion at the other. The practice of tax avoidance along 
this continuum sets up an interesting and relevant agency dilemma. Research shows that 
some level of tax avoidance is desirable. If a firm pays less tax through legitimate tax 
saving strategies, shareholders benefit as does management when incentives are properly 
aligned (Slemrod, 2004).  
However, if a firm pays less tax through non-legitimate means, such 
aggressiveness can result in loss of earnings through tax penalties and interest (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010), and can also represent reputational risk that further diminishes 
shareholder returns (Slemrod, 2004). Furthermore, creating and maintaining legitimate 
tax savings often involves complex corporate planning and structuring initiatives. Such 
initiatives require effort on the part of tax professionals. Shirking aspects associated with 
agency theory suggest that risk-averse managers may shy away from such additional 
effort; other managers may use the opportunity for their own personal gain (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2009).  
These complex and competing objectives have motivated research analyzing the 





Heitzman (2010) contend that tax avoidance behavior is, as of yet, not well-understood. 
Much of prior research analyzes firm characteristics that result in higher levels of tax 
avoidance. Such characteristics include the use of tax shelters (e.g., Alexander, Ettredge, 
Stone, & Sun, 2009; Lisowsky, 2010; Wilson, 2009) or tax havens (e.g., Dyreng & 
Lindsey, 2009), foreign operations (e.g., Alexander et al., 2009; Rego, 2003), book/tax 
differences (e.g., Heltzer, 2009; Mills, 1998), and leverage (e.g., Graham & Tucker, 
2006; Wilson, 2009).  
In addition, some tax avoidance research focuses more specifically on agency-
related issues that explore the roles of both monitoring and incentive alignment. Phillips 
(2003) finds that after-tax performance measures for CEOs and business unit managers 
result in lower effective tax rates. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) link increased levels of 
stock-based compensation to decreased levels of tax sheltering, especially in companies 
with weak governance. S. Chen, Chen, Cheng and Shevlin (2010) also explore the role of 
governance in tax avoidance activities and find that family-owned companies are less tax 
aggressive than non-family companies. Finally, Robinson et al. (2010) conclude that 
when CFOs evaluate their tax departments as profit centers rather than cost centers, tax 
departments are incentivized to reduce book ETR.
9
 
Another stream of research examines the role of external independent auditors 
(hereafter auditors) in tax avoidance. Auditors are hired to help minimize agency 
conflicts between shareholders and management (e.g., DeFond, 1992; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). However, it is unclear whether auditor-provided tax services (tax NAS) 
minimize or increase agency issues. For example, Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz (2004) 
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report that tax NAS is negatively associated with financial statement restatements. G.V. 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2011) also identify benefits to tax NAS purchases, finding 
that tax NAS is negatively related to earnings management. Gleason and Mills (2011) 
report that tax NAS is related to conservative income tax reporting. 
A number of studies (e.g., Cook, Huston, & Omer, 2008; Cook & Omer, 2010) 
report a positive association between tax NAS and tax aggressiveness. As noted 
previously, tax aggressive behavior may not always be in the shareholders’ best interest 
(e.g., Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010; Slemrod, 2004). In an 
effort to resolve this question concerning the benefits of tax avoidance, Dhaliwal, Gal-Or, 
Naiker, and Sharma (2011) analyze the combined influence of corporate governance and 
external auditors on book-tax differences. The researchers find a positive association 
between book-tax differences and auditor-provided tax services, especially in companies 
with audit committee members that are considered accounting experts. Furthermore, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find that auditor-devised tax strategies are valued by investors 
more so than strategies from other sources. While these studies suggest an important link 
between tax avoidance activities and corporate governance mechanisms, they do not 
examine the executive in-charge of the tax function within the firm. 
Upper Echelon Theory 
Upper echelon theory suggests that firm decisions are influenced by the unique 
individual perspectives of the executives who make those decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). Since individual perceptions and values may be difficult to discern, “observable 
managerial characteristics” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984, p. 196) are widely used in the 





characteristics have traditionally included age, education, functional background, and 
tenure, among other factors (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
10
  
Numerous scholars have applied Hambrick and Mason’s upper echelon model by 
hypothesizing how these characteristics influence organizational outcomes and results. 
Researchers have studied background characteristics of CEOs (e.g., Bertrand & Schoar, 
2003; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2010; Cronqvist, Makhija, & Yonker, 2011; Herrmann & 
Datta, 2002), CFOs (e.g., Ge, Matsumoto, & Zhang, 2011; Geiger & North, 2011), and 
top management teams as a whole (e.g., H. Chen, Hsu, & Huang, 2010; Jaw & Lin, 2009) 
in an effort to explain organizational policies and strategies.
11
 More recent analyses have 
expanded beyond typical background characteristics to consider how managers’ personal 
political orientation (Christensen & Dhaliwal, 2011) and personal tax aggressiveness 
(Chyz, 2011) influence firm-level tax avoidance. These studies are discussed in more 
detail below. 
Managerial background and corporate tax strategy. Some recent tax 
avoidance research has recognized the influence of individuals within the firm, including 
top executives. Dyreng et al. (2010) track 908 executives who work for two or more 
companies over a time period ranging from 1992 to 2006. The executives they follow 
include CEOs, CFOs, and a group of other executives with titles such as president or vice 
president. However, their focus is on top executives and they do not distinguish tax 
executives from other executives. Using GAAP and cash ETRs as proxies for tax 
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 Hambrick and Mason (1984) further propose that a manager’s socioeconomic background and 
financial dependence on the firm (as measured through the percent of total personal income that is derived 
from the firm) can influence decision-making, as can the level of heterogeneity within the management 
group. These factors are outside the scope of this analysis, primarily due to unavailability of related data. 
11
 Some of the strategies and policies investigated include internationalization and foreign entry 
mode, research and development, capital expenditures, acquisitions, leverage, dividends, discretionary 





avoidance, the authors find that “individual executives play a significant role in 
determining the level of tax avoidance that firms undertake” (Dyreng et al., 2010, p. 
1163).  
In a smaller sample of this executive group, Dyreng et al. (2010) also analyze the 
impact of various executive characteristics on tax avoidance. In particular, the authors 
look at an executive’s age, educational background, and gender and find no statistically 
significant relationship between these background characteristics and tax avoidance 
measures. The authors assert that these results suggest more of a “tone at the top” (p. 
1185) influence as opposed to a direct influence on tax avoidance decisions. This 
conclusion seems plausible given that the study is not specific to executives in the 
corporate tax function. However, the tax fraud cases previously highlighted suggest that 
some CEOs and CFOs were involved in and found legally liable for their firm’s tax 
avoidance decisions while others were not. The tax executive was also implicated but was 
not always held legally responsible or charged. 
Tax researchers following Dyreng et al. (2010) are creatively leveraging upper 
echelon logic, along with works of Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003), in their theoretical analyses of tax avoidance behavior. For example, Chyz (2011) 
leverages this theory, but veers away from the traditional background characteristics 
highlighted by Hambrick and Mason (1984). Using detail on stock option exercises by a 
firm’s managers, Chyz creates a measure for “personally tax aggressive” managers and 
finds evidence of influence on their respective firm’s tax aggressive behavior. 
Specifically, the author analyzes pre-SOX data related to 18,649 exercise and hold 





defined by Dhaliwal et al. (2009) to indicate the presence of a tax-aggressive manager, 
Chyz (2011) finds that companies with aggressive managers have lower GAAP and long-
run cash ETRs than companies without aggressive managers. 
Brown and Drake (2011) also utilize upper echelon theory to understand how 
board of directors’ relationships influence corporate tax avoidance. The researchers study 
board ties across low-tax companies during the period 1996 to 2005. Analyzing 9,298 
firm-year observations from 2,037 unique companies, the authors define low-tax 
companies as those with three-year average cash ETRs in the lowest quintile of the 
sample. Brown and Drake (2011) analyze the number of board ties that a company has 
with low-tax companies in the sample by looking at general board ties as well as ties 
specific to the CEO and CFO (i.e. executive ties). They find that companies with general 
board ties and executive-specific ties to low tax companies tend also to have low cash 
ETRs.  
Christensen and Dhaliwal (2011) are the most recent researchers to utilize upper 
echelon theory to enhance our understanding of tax aggressiveness. The researchers 
analyze 14,174 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2008 to explore the relationship 
between a manager’s political party contributions and a firm’s corporate tax avoidance. 
Considering the percentage of Republican (or Democratic) Party contributions to total 
contributions, the authors find that companies run by Republican managers engage in less 
tax avoidance than companies run by Democratic managers. However, like Dyreng et al. 
(2010), Brown and Drake (2011), and Chyz (2011), Christensen and Dhaliwal (2011) 
look broadly at corporate leadership (primarily the CEO, CFO, and top management 





While not specific to tax executives, this manager-effects research stream 
supports upper echelon theory and demonstrates the influence that individual decision-
makers have on corporate tax outcomes. Shifting focus specifically to tax executives, 
Armstrong et al. (2011) use a proprietary data set from a human resources consulting firm 
to examine incentive compensation of tax directors charged with overseeing the corporate 
tax function. In an analysis of 423 public companies (1,162 firm-year observations) only 
with an ITF, the authors find that the tax director’s incentive compensation is positively 
related to some measures of tax aggressiveness. Specifically, Armstrong et al. (2011) find 
a statistically significant negative relationship between a firm’s GAAP ETR and its tax 
director’s total annual compensation as well as the ratio of variable compensation to total 
compensation. Note, however, that the researchers do not find a statistically significant 
relationship between tax director compensation and cash ETR, or between other 
executives’ (CEO, CFO, and General Counsel) compensation and cash or GAAP ETRs. 
Armstrong et al.’s (2011) inconsistent result can be explained by Dyreng et al. (2010) 
who suggest that cash ETR and GAAP ETR reflect different objectives of tax avoidance. 
For example, cash ETR reflects tax avoidance resulting from temporary book/tax 
differences. Alternatively, GAAP ETR captures only that tax avoidance attributable to 
permanent differences, those that impact total tax expense and, therefore, after-tax book 
income. Armstrong et al. (2011) conclude that tax directors of these publicly traded 
companies are incentivized to maximize after-tax profits through GAAP ETR, consistent 
with Robinson et al. (2010).  
Klassen et al. (2012) analyze the association between tax aggressiveness and tax 





tax preparer type as internal, external auditor, or external non-auditor and measure tax 
aggressiveness using publicly available information on FIN 48 uncertain tax benefits 
(UTBs). In their sample of 1,533 observations for 2008 and 2009, Klassen et al. (2012) 
report a statistically significant association between internally prepared tax returns and 
higher levels of UTBs reported in the current year (i.e. higher levels of tax 
aggressiveness). In addition, they find that tax returns prepared by an external consultant 
other than the auditor are more aggressive than those returns prepared by the external 
auditor. While Klassen et al. (2012) consider internal versus external tax preparer types in 
this analysis, they do not specifically analyze companies with internal tax functions 
versus those without an internal function. As such, their classification of external preparer 
types may include companies with an internal tax function that choose to use an external 
firm (audit or non-audit) for tax return preparation.
12
  
Together, the current body of research suggests that tax executives can influence 
tax avoidance. However, not all companies staff an ITF. Some companies may outsource 
this role, while others may have an ITF that may not be extensive. Mills et al. (1998) find 
that a firm’s investment in tax planning resources leads to lower effective tax rates, 
regardless of whether those resources are staffed internally or externally. However, they 
do not investigate how tax avoidance differs between external and internal providers. A 
firm’s outsource versus in-source decision determines whether an internal tax expert 
serves as the primary decision-maker with regard to tax avoidance strategies. Without 
internal tax expertise, a firm’s tax strategy decisions are made primarily by either (1) an 
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external consultant with relatively less in-depth firm-specific knowledge or (2) an 
internal executive with relatively less in-depth tax expertise.  
The absence of an ITF may suggest that a firm is relatively less focused on tax 
avoidance or has less complex operations that do not lend themselves to significant tax 
planning opportunities. Maintaining in-house tax expertise may not be viewed as a 
significant priority by firm management. In these instances, tax strategy decisions may be 
made by an executive with little tax expertise.   
Alternatively, the absence of an ITF may be reflective of employment market 
conditions for tax professionals and indicate that a firm is relying heavily on an external 
tax service provider for tax advice. Some post-SOX commentary on the tax profession 
suggests that “a drought of tax experts in the global market” (Holub, 2002, p. 199) 
provides a sound judgment for outsourcing to specialists who are better positioned to 
keep up with the complexity of changing rules and regulations. Using an external service 
provider could therefore signal an increased focus on tax avoidance and increased access 
to complex tax saving strategies. While there are alternatives for staffing the tax function, 
a firm’s investment in an ITF suggests tax planning is an important strategic focus. 
Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H1: The existence of an internal tax function is related to a firm’s level of tax 
avoidance. 
Professional certification. The impact of certification on tax avoidance 
decisions is unclear. Certification serves as a means for regulating a profession by 
ensuring that only individuals meeting certain quality standards obtain and maintain 





the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), American Bar 
Association (ABA), and various state accounting or bar associations such as the Georgia 
Society of Certified Public Accountants (GSCPA) or the New York State Bar Association 
(NYSBA). These organizations typically regulate their members through certain 




Deviation from the prescribed code of conduct can result in disciplinary action, 
including termination of one’s license to practice (Dahlin, 2009). This punitive system 
may encourage certified tax executives to make less aggressive and less risky tax 
decisions. At the same time, continuing education requirements associated with 
certification may give tax executives greater exposure to technical developments and 
provide an enhanced understanding of the tax law and related procedures. This education 
may also provide exposure to legitimate tax saving strategies which could in turn result in 
more aggressive tax behavior (Erard, 1993).  
Research in corporate tax avoidance has not directly empirically investigated 
these competing arguments. In a related study of the topic, past research found that 
certification influences tax executives’ self-reported levels of tax aggressiveness.
14
 
However, this self-reported tax aggressive behavior has not been linked to established 
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measures of corporate tax avoidance. While a gap exists in the corporate tax literature, 
considerable research explores the role of CPA certification on decisions that external tax 
advisors make for individual taxpayer clients. This literature can help evaluate the 
potential relationship between professional certification and corporate tax avoidance.  
Ayers et al. (1989) draw upon the economic theory of regulation to suggest that 
Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), as a regulated group of tax preparers, can offer 
clients a broader range of tax services including the ability to represent clients in IRS 
matters. This broader perspective provides CPAs with greater exposure to procedural 
aspects of the IRS, helps them to develop networks for problem resolution, and enables 
them to devise aggressive strategies that favor taxpayers with an opportunity to defend 
any positions challenged by the IRS. To test this assertion, Ayers et al. (1989) conduct 
experimental research on how CPAs as compared to other paid preparers conclude on an 
ambiguous tax case. They find that CPAs’ responses were more pro-taxpayer (i.e. more 
aggressive) than their non-CPA counterparts.  
Hite and Hasseldine (2003) perform an analysis of 2,253 individual audit cases 
with the IRS and find results contrary to Ayers et al. (1989). Their research indicates that, 
upon audit, CPA-prepared returns yield an additional tax assessment less frequently than 
non-CPA prepared returns. This result suggests that CPA-prepared returns reflect more 
conservative tax positions than returns prepared by other sources or that the IRS 
perceives CPA prepared returns to be of higher quality (i.e., in compliance).
15
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Responses from the IRS’ 1987 Survey of Tax Practitioners and Advisors suggest 
that CPAs and attorneys are more likely than other preparers to report pro-client stances 
on ambiguous tax issues. In a subsequent analysis of data from the IRS survey, Jackson 
and Milliron (1989) dispute the original conclusions. The researchers find no statistically 
significant differences among preparer groups analyzed
16
 and further note that the history 
of IRS penalty assessments against these groups is likewise not sufficiently significant to 
support such a conclusion.
17
 
Using a subsample of data from the 1979 Internal Revenue Service TCMP Phase 
III data files, Erard (1993) analyzes non-compliance across individual tax returns. His 
research captures differences associated with return preparation mode including (1) use 
of a CPA or attorney, (2) use of a non-CPA, non-attorney, and (3) self-preparation. 
Comparing examiner-determined and taxpayer-reported amounts, Erard (1993) finds that 
non-compliance is positively associated with the use of CPAs and attorneys. However, 
Erard’s broad definition of non-compliance includes both understatements and 
overstatements of income. Raw statistics indicate that approximately 42% of returns with 
an understatement of income are prepared by CPAs or attorneys, while approximately 
44% of returns with an overstatement of income are prepared by CPAs or attorneys 
(Erard, 1993).
18
 While these results indicate that certification influences tax compliance, 
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two or more individuals working with clients on federal tax matters and who have worked with clients on 
federal tax matters for less than 20 years. 
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a determination of conservative versus aggressive non-compliance cannot be derived 
from the extant research.  
Because of this mixed evidence at the individual level and lack of prior research 
at the firm level, I do not predict a sign for the relationship between certification and tax 
avoidance. The difference in the level of analysis is important because corporate tax 
returns have received greater public and regulatory scrutiny (e.g., Forelle & Bryan-Low, 
2013; Linebaugh et al., 2013; Yadron et al., 2013) and have significant economic and 
other consequences if there is a dispute or allegations of abusive tax behavior (Beale, 
2004). Thus, it is not clear how professional certification of the in-house tax executive 
would relate to corporate tax avoidance. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is in the null. 
H2: An in-house tax executive’s professional certification is not related to a 
firm’s level of tax avoidance.  
Educational background. Education is a means of building skills and 
knowledge to support the decision-making process. Knowledge “is a prerequisite for 
expert performance” (Bouwman & Bradley, 1997, p. 93) and is, therefore, an important 
characteristic of the IHTE. Eriksen and Fallan (1996) recognize the influence of this 
factor and conduct a quasi-experiment on students in the second year of a business 
program to gauge their tax knowledge and attitudes toward taxation. Questionnaires are 
administered to two groups of students both at the beginning and end of the academic 
year. The first group of subjects selected marketing as a two-year elective while the 
second group of subjects selected tax law as a two-year elective. Comparing results 





and end of the year, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) find that student attitudes toward tax 
evasion become less tolerant as their tax knowledge increases through education.  
Cloyd and Spilker (2000) also explore the association between education and the 
evaluation of tax issues in their analysis of decisions by accounting and law students. 
Looking at differences in the education process for the two groups, Cloyd and Spilker 
(2000) note that law students have greater exposure to case law as their textbooks consist 
primarily of actual court cases. In contrast, textbooks for accounting students present a 
tax rule and then provide examples of its application with little if any reference to case 
law. This difference in exposure to legal precedent could affect a student’s ability to 
evaluate tax issues (Cloyd and Spilker, 2000).  
To test this assertion, Cloyd and Spilker (2000) conduct an experiment using 
accounting and law students. The authors present both groups of students with an 
ambiguous individual tax issue regarding the taxation of a real estate transaction. 
Subjects are asked to make a recommendation on the appropriate tax treatment for the 
transaction. Presentation materials include the case scenario, details of relevant income 
tax law, and information regarding their hypothetical client’s preferred tax position. 
Based on evidence gathered in the experiment, the researchers conclude that law students 
were relatively less influenced by their client’s preferences than their accounting student 
counterparts.  
In a similar analysis, Chang and McCarty (1988) find differences in tax 
judgments across undergraduate and graduate accounting students. They explore a 
substantial authority question related to individual tax treatment of a real estate 





After presenting the case scenario, Chang and McCarty (1988) ask subjects to conclude 
on the level of authority supporting capital gains treatment, and then evaluate criteria 
used by the subjects to reach those judgments. The researchers find relatively greater 
consensus in decision-making among the group comprised entirely of graduate students. 
They also find that the student groups differed in their use of relevant decision criteria.  
While this research is not directly focused on corporate tax reporting or 
aggressive tax decision-making, these combined works suggest that educational 
background influences how an individual views and evaluates tax-related issues. A 
specific directional hypothesis, however, cannot be determined from the above research 
nor can it be extended to tax professionals in practice because students do not face 
economic consequences or other incentives (e.g., a desire to protect employment status or 
adhere to a professional code of ethics, etc.) related to the tax positions taken. 
Accordingly, I hypothesize a non-directional association between education and tax 
avoidance for this reason. Since tax professionals’ education may include only an 
undergraduate degree or can include a Masters degree or a legal degree, and more 
education could manifest in more conservative or aggressive tax reporting behavior, I 
hypothesize that differences in educational background are related to tax avoidance.  
H3: An in-house tax executive’s educational background is related to a firm’s 
level of tax avoidance. 
Experience level. Experience, like education, builds knowledge and allows 
individuals to apply their knowledge in practice and become experts over time. 
Experience often serves as a measure of expertise in accounting research since “’gaining 





Bradley, 1997, p. 122). An individual’s level of experience can influence how that 
individual perceives and develops a solution to a problem (e.g., Cuccia, 1994; Lehmann 
& Norman, 2006; Lowe, Reckers, & Wyndelts, 1993; Pei, Reckers, & Wyndelts, 1992). 
Lowe et al. (1993) hypothesize that less experienced tax preparers are more likely to rely 
on superficial details of a problem while experienced tax preparers rely more heavily on 
fundamental conceptual issues in their decision-making. Cuccia (1994) asserts that more 
experienced tax preparers may have greater confidence in their ability to interpret tax law 
and may therefore see the same tax issue as “less threatening” than a less experienced 
preparer. Experience is therefore an important consideration in an analysis of tax 
avoidance decisions.  
Experience may also be a factor that can help explain mixed results in other 
research. For example, the certification research noted above was inconclusive with 
regard to its influence on tax avoidance. However, Ayers et al. (1989) and Hite and 
Hasseldine (2003) look only at certification, not at experience. Since both certification 
and experience serve to build tax knowledge, these inconsistent results might be 
explained by this correlated omitted variable.  
Tax research involving the influence of experience on tax aggressiveness has also 
yielded mixed results. For example, results from an IRS survey (1987) suggest that tax 
practitioners incompatible with the IRS’ mission are more likely to be CPAs and are also 
more likely to have worked with clients for less than 20 years. This finding suggests a 
positive association between experience and conservative tax behavior. Jackson and 





1987 IRS survey, the researchers identify no statistically significant differences in 
responses between this “least compatible”
19
 group and other survey respondents.  
Pei et al. (1992) also analyze the influence of experience through an experiment 
with tax managers from a Big 6 firm. In studying these practitioners’ belief revisions 
upon researching an ambiguous client tax issue, the authors find that experienced tax 
managers are not influenced by client preference. This result suggests that more 
experienced tax professionals can objectively weigh positive and negative evidence and 
conclude in a client-neutral manner. In contrast, inexperienced tax managers tend to 
conclude in a manner contrary to client preference, following a pro-IRS (i.e. 
conservative) pattern rather than a pro-client, or aggressive, pattern. This result also 
contradicts the IRS (1987) findings, which suggest that less experienced practitioners are 
more likely to reach conclusions at odds with the IRS mission. Pei et al. (1992) offer an 
explanation for this conservative reaction, suggesting that inexperienced tax managers 
perceive a higher risk of “legal liability and professional sanction” (p. 191) than 
experienced managers. Given these contradictory results in individual tax research and 
the lack of analysis at the firm level, Hypothesis 4 is presented in the null form. 
H4: An in-house tax executive’s years of experience is not related to a firm’s 
level of tax avoidance. 
Gender. Some gender-based research (e.g., Mason & Mudrack, 1996) 
hypothesizes that women are taught values that reflect a concern for others while men are 
taught values that are more self-focused and self-assertive; these differences lead men 
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and women to evaluate ethical issues differently. Other gender-based research (e.g., 
Gomez-Mejia, 1983) argues that occupational experiences can offset these sociological 
values over time, which would lead men and women to make similar ethical judgments in 
the workplace. Additionally, a literature review on gender differences by Byrnes, Miller, 
and Schafer (1999) indicates that women generally take less risk and are less aggressive 
than men. Ethics, risk aversion, and aggressiveness are factors that can influence tax 
avoidance decisions. 
Prior accounting research suggests that gender differences influence ethical 
decision-making in accounting, although results of this research are mixed. Dahlin (2009) 
conducts two separate studies to assess gender differences in ethical decision making by 
Certified Management Accountants (CMAs). Results of this research indicate minor 
differences across gender groups but do not identify any significant differences between 
male and female CMAs. However, in an analysis of CPAs disciplined by their state 
boards for work-related ethics violations, Schaefer and Welker (1994) find that these 
disciplined CPAs are most likely to be males employed by small CPA firms.  
Additional research explores the influence of gender on financial reporting 
decisions. For example, Barua, Davidson, Rama, and Thiruvadi (2010) analyze the 
association between CFO gender and accruals quality. In an analysis of data from 2,771 
observations, Barua et al. (2010) find that female CFOs are associated with lower 
reported levels of absolute abnormal accruals (total and current) and with lower accrual 
estimation errors. Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang (2011) investigate how CFO characteristics 
influence certain accounting choices, including discretionary accruals, operating lease 





management. In an analysis of 2,565 observations, Ge et al. (2011) report no statistically 
significant relationship between CFO gender and any of the accounting variables 
analyzed.
20
 More recently, Jia, Van Lent, and Zeng (2013) analyze the relationship 
between testosterone levels and financial misreporting. The researchers find that higher 
levels of testosterone are positively related to financial restatements resulting from 
intentional irregularities, and that testosterone exposure also serves as a predictor of stock 
option backdating within their sample. 
Tax–specific research on gender differences tends to focus on individual taxpayer 
compliance issues. Both Cullis et al. (2006) and Hasseldine and Hite (2003) find that 
male and female taxpayers reach different compliance reporting decisions when exposed 
to similar framing effects. In addition, Fallan (1999) finds that male and female students’ 
attitudes toward tax ethics change with more exposure to tax knowledge. Male students, 
however, are more apt to reconsider attitudes toward their own tax evasion while female 
students are more apt to reconsider attitudes toward others’ tax evasion. While this tax-
specific research suggests that males and females may reach different tax avoidance 
decisions, other research (e.g., Dahlin, 2009; Ge et al., 2011) suggests that finance and 
accounting professionals do not always exhibit these same gender differences when faced 
with business decisions. As a result of this contradictory evidence, the expected 
relationship between gender and tax avoidance is stated as a null hypothesis.  
H5: An in-house tax executive’s gender is not related to a firm’s level of tax 
avoidance.  
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Audit committee background and corporate outcomes. Boards of directors 
and related committees serve an important control function designed to protect 
shareholder interests (DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed, 2002). Audit 
committees in particular are usually charged with oversight of important areas that 
include (1) financial reporting, (2) internal controls, and (3) auditor activity (DeZoort et 
al., 2002). Audit committee research to date has explored procedural aspects of the 
committee (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2009) as well as its composition. 
Composition studies have investigated a variety of committee and member 
characteristics, including independence and expertise, which encompasses experience, 
knowledge, and ability (DeZoort et al., 2002).  
The analysis of audit committee expertise is of particular interest for my extension 
of upper echelon theory to tax avoidance choices. Research in this area explores the 
connection between this expertise and various accounting outcomes including stock 
returns and financial reporting quality (FRQ). For example, research on stock returns 
suggests that investors value financial (e.g., Davidson, Biao, & Weihong, 2004) and 
accounting expertise (e.g., DeFond, Hann, & Xuesong, 2005). With regard to FRQ, G.V. 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) conclude that accounting expertise is positively related 
to accounting conservatism when measured through accruals or reserves, while Naiker 
and Sharma (2009) find that audit committee experience as an audit partner is negatively 
associated with internal control weaknesses and earnings management. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2010) find that accruals quality is positively influenced by a combination of accounting 
and financial expertise, while Pomeroy (2010) reports that an audit committee’s 





accounting expertise. Furthermore, J. Krishnan, Yuan, and Wanli (2011) note a positive 
association between legal expertise and FRQ. 
Audit committees and taxes. Income tax reporting and related risk 
management decisions have garnered significant focus in the post-SOX era. The large 
percentage of 404 weaknesses attributable to tax ("Section 404: Where the weaknesses 
are," 2006) and FIN 48’s refined focus on income tax uncertainties have changed the way 
audit committees review and monitor tax reporting (Gutman & Smith, 2007). Years after 
initial implementation of SOX and FIN48, these issues remain high priority for corporate 
boards and audit committees. For example, in a 2008 PricewaterhouseCoopers survey 
(see "Accounting for tax high on the agenda," 2008), 20% of businesses indicated that tax 
accounting was a part of every audit committee meeting agenda. In 2011, internal control 
risk and tax risk were among the top 10 ‘to-dos’ for audit committees (McCarthy, 2011).  
Despite this practical and relevant connection, academic research considering how 
the audit committee interacts with the corporate tax function is quite limited. In one 
study, Ghosh, Marra, and Moon (2010) investigate the connection between earnings 
management and corporate boards and audit committees. Using deferred taxes as a proxy 
for earnings management, the authors find no variance associated with audit committee 
financial expertise.
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 In another study, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) consider the influence of 
audit committee expertise on tax-related decisions. Noting the audit committee’s 
responsibility for approving the provision of auditor-provided tax services, the authors 
investigate the connection among these services, book-tax differences, and uncertain tax 
benefits under FIN 48. Their research suggests that auditor-provided tax services are 
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positively related to book-tax differences in companies with accounting experts on the 
audit committee. Furthermore, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find investors value these auditor-
devised tax strategies more positively than tax strategies provided by a non-audit firm 
and not subject to audit committee approval.  
Leveraging accounting and tax research on audit committee expertise, I 
hypothesize that the relationship between an ITF (or IHTE characteristics) and tax 
avoidance is moderated by the expertise of audit committee members. I consider specific 
accounting expertise (e.g., DeFond et al., 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Pomeroy, 2010) as 
opposed to broader financial expertise (e.g., Davidson et al., 2004; Fich & Shivdasani, 
2007), and also evaluate legal expertise (J. Krishnan et al., 2011). In addition to 
considering accounting and legal expertise consistent with prior research, I incorporate 
the influence of tax-specific expertise within the audit committee. Given the limited yet 
contradictory evidence with regard to audit committee expertise and tax outcomes, I do 
not provide directional hypotheses. 
H6A: The relationship between the existence of an internal tax function and a 
firm’s tax avoidance behavior is moderated by the presence of an (accounting, 
tax, or legal) expert on the audit committee. 
H6B: The relationship between the in-house tax expert’s background 
characteristics and a firm’s tax avoidance behavior is moderated by the presence 







Determination of the Research Sample 
In this study, I analyze firm data for the period 2007 to 2010. This examination 
period begins with 2007 because FIN 48 (2006) first became effective for publicly traded 
companies for financial statement periods beginning after December 15, 2006. In 
addition, the initial year corresponds to the first full year in which PCOAB (2005) 
guidelines for auditor independence and the provision of tax services became effective 
for public companies and their auditors. Limiting the sample to this time period helps 
control for changes in tax avoidance that could be a direct result of these changes in 
regulatory and reporting requirements. 
Various databases provide detail on the variables of interest. Background 
information on in-house tax experts was gathered from Capital IQ (CIQ), LinkedIn, the 
Tax Executives Institute (TEI) membership database and other internet sources. 
Background information on non-tax corporate executives and audit committee members 
was gathered primarily from CIQ and supplemented through other databases, such as 
Morningstar, and alternative internet sources. I calculate the remaining variables from 
financial information available in Compustat and supplement with information from CIQ, 
Audit Analytics, or Corporate Library where necessary. Source information for each 





Panel A of Table 1 details the sample selection process. The sample begins with 
publicly traded U.S. companies and is limited to the 2010 S&P 1500 as listed in the CIQ 
database. This approach is due to the volume of data that must be hand-collected and is 
consistent with other tax avoidance research (e.g., Alexander et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 
2010). Also consistent with prior research, I exclude financial institutions from the study 
(e.g., Blouin, Gleason, Mills, & Sikes, 2007, 2010; Heltzer, 2009). In addition, I restrict 
my analysis to include only those companies that have positive pre-tax income for the 
years in question. This approach is consistent with McGuire, Omer, and Wang (2012) and 
limits the analysis to profitable companies “where tax avoidance is likely to be a priority” 
(p. 986). Furthermore, Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Robinson et al. (2010) note the 
difficulty in interpreting ETRs that are less than 0% or greater than 100%. Thus, I limit 
my sample to those companies with ETRs that range from 0% to 100%. Finally, I look to 
the availability of financial and biographical information in CIQ to ensure complete and 
relevant information on variables to be included in the analysis. This initial screening 
generates a 2010 list of 578 companies for inclusion in the study and yields an estimated 
sample of 2,312 (578*4) when all four years are considered. 
The initial list of 2,312 firm-year observations is further reduced for a number of 
conditions, including availability of information from each of above data sources that 
supplement CIQ. First, the sample is reduced for companies with missing variables from 
Audit Analytics or Compustat and to eliminate members of the current S&P 1500 for 
which Capital IQ data is missing in earlier years (n = 644). Additionally, to the extent that 
the original 578 companies were not profitable or did not have effective tax rates between 





Table 1. Sample derivation and composition 
Panel A: Sample Derivation                         
 
Initial screening from Capital IQ 
         
  
2,312  
   
Less: Companies with missing data 
         
   
(644) 
   
Less: Companies with losses, ETRs > 100, or ETRs < 0% for 2007-2009 
   
   
(232) 
   
Less: Consulting companies 
    
     
(36) 
   
Final sample 
         
  
1,400  
   Panel B: S&P Composition 
             
  
 Full Sample  
 
 ITF Sample  
 
 No ITF Sample  
 S&P Index 
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              Panel C: Industry Composition 
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years are dropped from the sample (n = 232). Finally, accounting and tax consulting firms 
are eliminated from the sample (n = 36). This elimination ensures that any IHTE 
identified as a tax expert is responsible for tax saving strategies at their respective 
employers as opposed to providing tax consulting services to clients.  
In total, these selection criteria yield a sample size of 1,400 firm-year 
observations across the four years in question. The sample includes 486 observations 
from 2010, 312 from 2009, 265 from 2008, and 337 from 2007. Companies with an ITF 
comprise approximately 83% (n=1,159) of the total sample while firms without an ITF 
comprise the remaining 17% (n=241). The full sample was used for testing of Hypotheses 
1 and 6A related to a firm’s ITF. Tests of Hypotheses 2 through 5 and 6B, as well as 
certain supplemental analyses, were performed on smaller subsamples of this data. 
Derivations of those samples are disclosed in greater detail throughout the remainder of 
this paper. 
Panel B of Table 1 details the S&P composition of my sample. S&P 500 
companies make up 40% (n=563) of the full sample, while 25% (n=350) are MidCap 400 
companies and 35% (n=487) are SmallCap 600 companies. Ninety-six percent of S&P 
500 companies in the sample have an ITF, while 4% do not. As size decreases, so does 
the percentage of companies with an ITF. For example, 88% of MidCap 400 firms have 
an ITF while 12% do not. Approximately 64% of SmallCap 600 firms have an ITF while 
36% do not have an ITF. 
Panel C of Table 1 details the industry composition of the sample. Industry 
classification is based on two-digit SIC codes, consistent with prior tax research. The 





sample) are detailed in the table. If I split the sample into companies with and without an 
ITF, the descriptive statistics suggest that companies in paper and petroleum industries 
are most likely to establish their own in-house tax function, with 100% of sample 
companies having an ITF. By contrast, companies in the educational services industry are 
least likely to establish their own in-house tax function, with only 17% of sample 
companies having an ITF. 
Analyzing Tax Avoidance and In-house Tax Expertise 
I use a multivariate regression model to analyze the relationship between tax 
avoidance and the presence of an income tax function within a firm. The empirical 
model is based on prior studies that seek to explain tax avoidance behavior (e.g., 
Dyreng et al., 2010; Phillips, 2003; Rego, 2003; Robinson et al., 2010) and uses a 
firm’s GAAP effective tax rate (BOOK_ETR) as a measure of tax avoidance. H1 will 
be tested as follows: 
BOOK_ETR = f {ITF + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + LN_TA + 
PPE_TA + CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA + CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + 
BIG4 + PCT_TAXNAS + ACQ + BTM + RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR} (1) 
Dependent variable: Tax avoidance. The dependent variable, tax avoidance, can 
be defined through multiple financial statement measures. While each available measure 
can capture different aspects of a firm’s tax posture, each has limitations (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). The motivation for this analysis is driven in part by financial 
accounting scandals that increased focus on accounting for income taxes and shaped the 
financial reporting role of the corporate income tax department, as well as the recent 





tax avoidance using a measure equal to the book, or GAAP, effective tax rate reported in 
a company’s annual filings with the SEC.  
BOOK_ETR is calculated as total income tax expense divided by pre-tax book 
income.
22
 BOOK_ETR is a relevant measure in that it specifically considers tax planning 
opportunities that affect after-tax earnings and shareholder returns (e.g., Phillips, 2003; 
Robinson et al., 2010). However, researchers note some limitations inherent in this 
measure. For example, BOOK_ETR does not capture tax avoidance resulting from 
temporary differences that accelerate book deductions or defer book income for tax 
purposes (Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008). Additionally, Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) note that BOOK_ETR captures tax expense activity unrelated to tax avoidance, 
including changes in valuation allowances and statutory rates. Notwithstanding these 
potential limitations, for the reasons noted above BOOK_ETR is an appropriate measure 
for this particular analysis. In supplemental analysis, I also test an alternative measure of 
tax avoidance by using uncertain tax benefits as a dependent variable.   
Independent variables. Table 2 describes the test and control variables that are 
associated with tax avoidance. These variables are discussed in detail below. 
Presence of an internal tax function. The first independent variable of 
interest indicates whether or not a firm employs an internal tax function (ITF). ITF is 
coded as a dummy variable, where 1 represents the existence of an internal tax function 
and 0 represents the absence of an internal tax function. The existence of an internal tax 
department can be inferred from employee data available from Capital IQ and other 
sources.   
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Sign Variable Description Data Source 
   
Dependent Variable (Tax Avoidance Proxy) 
   
  BOOK_ETR  Total Tax Expense divided by Pretax Book Income (PTI) Compustat 
  Variables of Interest     
  ITF +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if company employs an in-house tax function for 
the year in question. 0 otherwise. 
Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  Experience 
(LN_EXPERIENCE) 
+/- Continuous variable equal to the log of an IHTE's years of professional 
experience as of the year in question. 
Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  CERT_ATTY +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if IHTE is a certified attorney, 0 otherwise. Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  CPA +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if IHTE has been certified as a CPA, 0 
otherwise. 
Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  MACC +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if the IHTE has obtained a Masters in 
Accounting. 0 otherwise. 
Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  MTX +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if the IHTE has obtained a Masters in Tax. 0 
otherwise. 
Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  MBA +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if the IHTE has obtained a Masters in Bus Adm. 
0 otherwise. 
Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  LAW +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if the IHTE has obtained a law degree such as a 
JD or LLM. 0 otherwise. 
Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  Gender (MALE) +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if the IHTE is male; 0 if the IHTE is female. Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  AC_ACCTG +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if audit committee includes a member with 
accounting expertise; 0 otherwise. 
Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  AC_LEGAL +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if audit committee includes a member with legal 
expertise; 0 otherwise. 
Capital IQ, Morningstar, and other internet sources 
  AC_TAX +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if audit committee includes a member with tax 
expertise; 0 otherwise. 













Sign Variable Description Data Source 
  Control Variables     
  CFO Tax Expertise (CFO_TAX) +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if CFO has tax expertise; 0 otherwise. Capital IQ 
  Other Tax Expertise 
(OTH_EXEC_TAX) 
+/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if another company executive has tax expertise; 
0 otherwise. 
Capital IQ 
  Size (LN_TA) +/- Natural Log of Total Assets Compustat 
  Leverage (LEV) +/- Leverage calculated as Current + Long-term Debt divided by Total Assets. Compustat 
  ROA +/- Return on Assets Capital IQ 
  Capital Intensity (PPE_TA) - Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by Total Assets Compustat 
  
NOL +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 for companies with NOL carry forward as of 
current year, 0 otherwise. 
Capital IQ 
  








% Change in Sales 
(CHG_SALES) 
+ Annual percentage change in Net Sales Compustat 
  
Foreign Operations (FOREIGN) +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if company has foreign income tax expense 
greater than or less than $0, 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
  
Audit Quality (BIG4) - Indicator variable equal to 1 if auditor is D&T, E&Y, KPMG, or PWC (BIG 
4), 0 otherwise. 
Audit Analytics 
  
Tax Non-Audit Services 
(PCT_TAXNAS) 
- Tax-related non-audit fees paid to the corporation's auditor divided by total 
audit and non-audit fees paid to the auditor 
Audit Analytics 
  
Acquisition Activity (ACQ) +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if a company reports acquisition-related 
expenses in the current year, 0 otherwise 
Compustat 
  
Book to Market Value (BTM) - Calculated as Book Value of Shareholder's Equity/Mkt Value of 
Shareholders' Equity (calculated as number of common shares outstanding at 
end of year*closing share price at end of year) 
Compustat 
  
Research & Development 
(RD_TA) 
- Research and Development expense scaled by Total Assets Compustat 
  
INDUSTRY +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if company i is a member of industry j. Industry 
categories are defined by two-digit SIC codes. 
Capital IQ 
  YEAR +/- Series of indicator variables equal to 1 for each of four years under 







If Capital IQ provides biographical information for an employee in the income tax 
function, then the respective firm is assigned a value of 1 for this variable. To the extent 
Capital IQ is incomplete with regard to this information, I supplement my search through 
other internet and print sources, including firm websites, LinkedIn, Tax Executives 
Institute (TEI), and Google.
23
 When this combination of sources does not yield 
information on tax personnel, then I assume that no internal tax function exists and assign 
this firm a value of 0. For reliability purposes, 1,204 of the total 1,400 observations were 
cross-checked against multiple sources, with minimal discrepancies noted.  
Background characteristics of the in-house tax expert. To explore the 
relationship between tax avoidance and background characteristics of the IHTE (H2 
through H5), I re-estimate Equation (1) through four iterations, separately including each 
of four background characteristics.
24
 IHTE_CHARACTERISTICS is used to denote the 
four distinct background characteristics that will be tested. These four characteristics are 
described in more detail below. The regression model is represented by the following 
equation: 
BOOK_ETR = f {IHTE_CHARACTERISTICS + ITF + CFO_TAX + 
OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA 
+ CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + PCT_TAXNAS + ACQ + BTM + 
RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR}             (2) 
All of the information analyzed is obtained through voluntary disclosure. None of 
it is mandatorily disclosed. Because of the voluntary nature of the information, it is 
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 Using these websites, I conducted additional internet searches, as needed, in an effort to identify 
companies that have an internal tax department and to locate background details for individuals within that 
department. 
24






sometimes difficult to find complete biographical information for an IHTE. Each variable 
is therefore subject to a number of missing observations. Consequently, when I test these 
hypotheses, I test each background characteristic separately in an effort to maintain 
sample size.  
As with the ITF variable described above, I utilize biographical information 
available through Capital IQ, LinkedIn, and other internet sources. For this portion of the 
analysis, I look to the characteristics of the highest ranking member of the internal tax 
function, usually a vice president of tax, tax director, or tax manager. A lesser ranked 
employee such as a tax associate is used in instances where a vice president, director, or 
manager cannot be confirmed.
25
  
The specific IHTE characteristics analyzed include (1) professional certification, 
(2) educational background, (3) years of experience, and (4) gender. Years of experience 
(LN_EXPERIENCE) is measured as a continuous variable equal to the natural log of the 
tax executive’s total years of professional experience in a tax or related role (such as an 
accounting or legal role). I use the natural log to normalize data and to ensure that 
assumptions for OLS regression are met. The remaining personal and professional 
background information for the IHTE is represented through a series of dummy variables, 
where 1 indicates the presence of a particular characteristic and 0 indicates the absence of 
that characteristic. A value of 0 is also assigned for all background characteristic 
variables when an IHTE/ITF is not identified for a particular firm. This designation only 
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 According to a recent TEI survey (TEI, 2012), only 6% of senior tax executives held a title 
which is not the equivalent of manager or above. Approximately 3% (39 of 1,400) of my sample (1) held 
titles below manager or (2) were missing a specific title in their biographical detail. See “Supplemental 





applies when I test using the full sample and not when using the sample for firms with an 
ITF. 
Consistent with Cleaveland et al. (2010), professional certification will consider 
the tax executive’s qualifications as a CPA (CPA) or certified attorney (CERT_ATTY). 
A value of 1 in a category indicates certification in that particular category; 0 indicates no 
certification in that category (or the absence of an ITF). Also in keeping with Cleaveland 
et al. (2010), I gather information on other certification such as that of a CMA or CIA. 
However, certifications other than that as a CPA or certified attorney were observed in 
only 14 instances. As a result, I do not test these other certifications. 
Education considers various degrees earned by the tax executive. A series of 
dummy variables is used to indicate whether the executive has earned certain graduate 
degrees in addition to an undergraduate degree. I specifically look at whether the 
executive has obtained a Masters in Accounting (MACC), Masters in Taxation (MTX), 
Masters in Business Administration (MBA), and/or a law degree (LAW) such as a JD or 
a LLM. Note that the choice of Master’s degrees to include is consistent with degree 
information provided by the AICPA (Reigle, Bunning, & Moore, 2009). For each of 
these variables, 1 indicates completion of the designated degree and 0 indicates no degree 
in this particular area (or the absence of an ITF).  
Gender of the tax executive is also represented by a dummy variable. MALE 
equal to 1 indicates a male tax executive, while 0 indicates a female tax executive when 
an ITF is present (ITF = 1). As noted above, a value of 0 also indicates the absence of an 






Audit committee expertise. To test how the presence of certain audit committee 
expertise influences the relationship between tax avoidance and ITF, I re-estimate Equation (1) after 
including three additional variables. The first of these variables, AC_TAX, represents the existence 
of specific tax expertise within the audit committee. AC_ACCTG represents the existence of 
accounting expertise within the audit committee, while AC_LEGAL represents the existence of 
legal expertise within the audit committee. Additionally, I capture the moderating influence of audit 
committee expertise on the relationship between the presence of an ITF and BOOK_ETR.  
Each category of audit committee expertise is represented by a dummy variable, 
where 1 indicates the presence of at least one committee member with that particular 
expertise and 0 indicates the absence of such expertise. Legal expertise (AC_LEGAL) is 
defined in accordance with J. Krishnan et al. (2011) where an audit committee member 
has a law degree such as an LLM or JD and/or practical job experience as a lawyer with a 
law firm, or as legal counsel. Accounting expertise (AC_ACCTG) is defined in a manner 
consistent with Naiker and Sharma (2009) and Dhaliwal et al. (2010), where an audit 
committee member has accounting experience as a CPA or with a public accounting firm.  
An audit committee member is considered a tax expert (AC_TAX) to the extent 
that s/he has specific education or prior work experience that is income tax related. Tax-
specific education would include a tax-related degree such as a Masters in Taxation or a 
Masters of Law (LLM) in taxation. Prior tax-specific experience would include 
professional roles in one or more of the following capacities: (1) as an income tax 
consultant, income tax manager, income tax director, or other income tax employee in 
industry, public accounting, or with a governmental agency, (2) as a corporate manager, 





function, or (3) as a income tax policy analyst for governmental, nonprofit, or taxpayer 
advocacy groups. 
Due to multicollinearity issues when deriving product-interaction terms, the 
moderating effect is tested separately by estimating regressions for subsamples of each 
category of audit committee expertise (Aiken & West, 1991), that is when AC_TAX 
equals 1 and 0 (two subsamples), and so on. The empirical models for this analysis 
(H6A) follow, where Equations 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are for testing for subsamples of firms 
with and without AC_TAX, AC_LEGAL, and AC_ACCTG, respectively: 
BOOK_ETR = f {ITF + AC_LEGAL + AC_ACCTG + CFO_TAX + 
OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA 
+ CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + PCT_TAXNAS + ACQ + BTM + 
RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR}              (3.1) 
BOOK_ETR = f {ITF + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + CFO_TAX + 
OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA 
+ CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + PCT_TAXNAS + ACQ + BTM + 
RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR}              (3.2) 
BOOK_ETR = f {ITF + AC_TAX + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + 
OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA 
+ CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + PCT_TAXNAS + ACQ + BTM + 
RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR}              (3.3) 











(Measured as BOOK_ETR) 
Presence of an ITF 
_________________________ 
(Measured as Yes or No) 
AC Expertise 
_________________________ 






 I further consider the impact of the audit committee by testing how the presence 
of audit committee expertise influences the relationship between tax avoidance and 
background characteristics of the IHTE. For purposes of this analysis, I re-estimate 
Equation (3) four times after separately including the four IHTE characteristics defined in 
Equation (2). I then separately interact these four characteristics with the three categories 
of audit committee expertise (tax, accounting, and legal) being investigated. To save 
space, I have again used the term IHTE_CHARACTERISTICS to collectively represent 
certification, education, experience, and gender. The empirical models for this analysis 
(H6B) follow, where Equations 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 are for testing for subsamples of firms 
with and without AC_TAX, AC_LEGAL, and AC_ACCTG, respectively:  
BOOK_ETR = f {IHTE_CHARACTERISTICS +AC_LEGAL + AC_ACCTG + 
ITF + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + LN_TA + PPE_TA + 
CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA + CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + 
PCT_TAXNAS + ACQ + BTM + RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR}     (4.1) 
BOOK_ETR = f {IHTE_CHARACTERISTICS +AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + ITF 
+ CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES 
+ LEV + SGA + CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + PCT_TAXNAS + 
ACQ + BTM + RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR}          (4.2) 
BOOK_ETR = f {IHTE_CHARACTERISTICS +AC_TAX + AC_LEGAL + ITF 
+ CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES 
+ LEV + SGA + CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + PCT_TAXNAS + 
ACQ + BTM + RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR}          (4.3) 


















 (Measured as BOOK_ETR) 
Characteristics of IHTE 
_________________________ 
(Measured through Certification, 





Firm-level control variables. In addition to the primary variables of interest, I 
include a number of control variables consistent with prior research. First, I control for 
variables related to a firm’s auditor, including audit quality (BIG 4) and provision of tax 
NAS (PCT_TAXNAS). This approach is consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2011), who find 
that higher audit quality and auditor-provision of tax NAS lead to higher levels of tax 
avoidance. Therefore, I expect both measures to yield lower effective tax rates (i.e. a 
negative association).  
In addition to auditor-related variables, I control for firm factors that have been 
considered in other tax avoidance research. First, I control for profitability through return 
on assets (ROA) and net operating loss carry forwards (NOL). Then I consider other 
financial indicators including size, leverage, capital investment, percentage change in 
sales, selling/general/administrative expenses, and foreign operations. These controls are 
discussed in more detail below.   
Profitable companies may have a greater incentive than loss companies to engage 
in tax planning (Rego, 2003), which should lead to lower effective rates. Phillips (2003) 
and Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find a negative association between Book (i.e. GAAP) ETR 
and ROA, which supports this assertion. However, Dyreng et al. (2010)
26
 and Robinson 
et al. (2010) find that ROA is positively related to Book ETR. As a result of this mixed 
evidence, I do not predict a sign for the coefficient on ROA. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) assert that companies with net operating losses have little 
incentive to implement tax planning strategies that reduce effective rates and 
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 Note that Dyreng et al. (2010) calculate ROA as EBITDA divided by Total Assets. Rego 
(2003), Robinson et al. (2010), and Phillips (2003) calculate ROA as pre-tax income divided by assets, 
while Dhaliwal et al. (2011) calculate ROA as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 






subsequently find a positive association between the existence of an NOL and effective 
tax rates. This relationship, however, can be complicated by a firm’s position with regard 
to valuation allowances and current taxes payable. These complications may help to 
explain a negative association between NOLs and ETRs that is evidenced in other prior 
research (e.g., Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009; Higgins, Omer, & Phillips, 2011; Rego, 2003). 
Given the history of mixed evidence, I do not predict a direction for the relationship 
between NOLs and ETR. 
Prior research documents the importance of firm size (LN_TA) in determining 
ETR (e.g., Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Mills et al., 1998; Phillips, 2003; Robinson et al., 
2010). Because results of this research are mixed, I do not predict the direction of this 
relationship. Leverage (LEV) has also been linked to ETR. Leverage may be 
representative of complex financing arrangements that minimize taxes (e.g., Mills, et al., 
1998). Alternatively, leverage may indicate reduced tax avoidance as companies with 
interest deductions from existing debt may have less incentive to engage in other tax 
planning activities (e.g., Dhaliwal, et al., 2011; Graham & Tucker, 2006; Higgins et al., 
2011). Given this mixed evidence, I do not predict a sign for the relationship between 
leverage and ETR.  
Foreign operations (FOREIGN) can also impact ETR; however, I do not predict 
the direction of this relationship as it may depend on the location of these operations and 
the firm’s respective tax position. For example, multinational firms may have more 
opportunity to shift income to low-tax countries than other firms (e.g, Dyreng & Lindsey, 
2009; Rego, 2003). Conversely, multinational firms may have operations in higher-rate 









Similarly, acquisition activity (ACQ) can impact ETR, but I do not predict a 
directional relationship as the direction may depend on other factors specific to the 
acquisition. For example, an acquisition may generate some permanent book/tax 
differences or changes in filing nexus, which in turn generate an increase in BOOK_ETR. 
Alternatively, an acquisition may present an opportunity for revisiting tax strategies and 
enable a firm to restructure existing or acquired operations in a more tax efficient 
manner. In this instance, acquisition activity may be negatively associated with ETR.  
I further control for selling, general and administrative expenses (SGA), changes 
in annual sales (CHG_SALES), research and development expense (RD_TA), and book 
to market ratio (BTM). Prior research reports a positive association between Book ETR 
and both SG&A expenses (Dyreng et al., 2010) and changes in annual sales (Dhaliwal et 
al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2010), but finds R&D (e.g., Boone, Khurana, & Raman, 2012; 
McGuire et al., 2012) and BTM (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; McGuire et al., 2012) are both 
associated with increased tax avoidance (i.e. lower tax rates). Thus, my predictions in the 
current analysis are consistent with these prior results.   
In addition, I control for capital investment (PPE_TA and CAPEX_PPE) (e.g., 
Dyreng et al., 2010; Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Mills et al., 1998), for fixed industry 
effects using two digit SIC classification (INDUSTRY), and for financial statement year 
(YEAR). No directional prediction is made with regard to the last two associations. 
Based on prior research (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Higgins et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 
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 Note that some prior tax research uses foreign pretax income (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2010) as an 
indicator of foreign operations. As my sample was missing some data for this variable, I instead use foreign 





2010), I predict a negative association between capital intensity (PPE_TA) and book 
ETR. Using a different measure for capital investment, Dyreng et al. (2010) find a 
positive association between CAPEX_PPE and book ETR. Following this research, I 
predict a similar association for CAPEX_PPE and my ETR measure. 
Corporate individual control variables. In addition to the firm level controls 
discussed above, I control for individual executive factors. First, I consider the possibility 
that executives not directly employed in the tax department may have tax-related work 
experience. The IHTE may report directly or indirectly to these executives, or may liaise 
with them in developing and executing organizational tax strategy. Thus, these 
individuals may be in a position to contribute to the firm’s tax strategy decision. 
Specifically, I include two controls to account for CFO tax experience (CFO_TAX) and 
other executives’ tax experience (OTH_EXEC_TAX). I define tax expertise for these 
officers consistent with my definition of audit committee tax expertise. Accordingly, 
CFO_TAX and OTH_EXEC_TAX equal 1 if the said executive has specific education or 
prior work experience that is income tax related. Note that I do not control for CEO tax 
experience as only two CEOs in the sample have tax experience. Since there is no prior 
research that analyzes the associations between tax avoidance and these expertise 
variables, I do not predict a direction for these relationships. 
When testing the influence of specific characteristics of the IHTE in Equations (2) 
and (4), I include my original ITF variable to control for the existence of any ITF. I also 
test Equations (2) and (4) only on those companies that have an ITF. For these tests, I do 
not include ITF as a control variable. Finally, prior upper echelon research (e.g., Bamber, 





I should also control for age of the IHTE in this analysis. However, I am unable to 
incorporate this variable into my tax avoidance analysis due to limited observations.
28
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 IHTE age was available for only 163 of 1,149 companies with an ITF. See IHTE supplemental 






DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Tax Avoidance and the Internal Tax Function (ITF) 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis. Panel A of Table 3 reports 
descriptive statistics on BOOK_ETR across the full sample and for companies with and 
without an ITF. Companies within the full sample have an average (median) 
BOOK_ETR of 31.9% (33.5%). The descriptive statistics for ETR suggest that 
companies employing an ITF have a lower ETR (mean = 31.2%) than companies that 
choose not to employee an ITF (mean = 35.2%). This difference is statistically significant 
(p = 0.000).  
Panel B of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for audit committee expertise. 
Approximately 53% of companies in the sample have an accounting expert on the audit 
committee. Accounting expertise composition is similar for companies with and without 
an ITF, as 53.5% and 51.0% of these companies, respectively, have an accounting expert 
on the audit committee. Composition for legal expertise is also similar across the entire 
sample, with 32.1% of all companies, 32.9% of ITF companies, and 28.6% of non-ITF 
companies having a legal expert on the audit committee. The accounting and legal 
expertise differences across ITF and non-ITF firms are not statistically significant. 
Fourteen percent of the total sample has an audit committee member that is a tax expert. 








Table 3. Descriptive statistics – internal tax function 
 
 Full Sample  
 
 ITF Sample  
 
 No ITF Sample  
      
 
(n = 1400)  
 
 (n = 1159)  
 
 (n = 241)  
 
 Test of Differences  
 Mean  
 
 Median  
 










 t-statistic  
 
 Wilcoxon Z  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Book ETR 
















Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Audit Committee Expertise 
















































Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
            






















































































































































































































































only 10.4% of companies without an ITF have a tax expert on the committee. This 
difference in audit committee expertise is statistically significant (p = 0.05).  
Panel C of Table 3 reports summary statistics for the control variables in this 
analysis. Overall, the descriptive information suggests significant differences between the 
ITF and non-ITF sample. For example, ITF firms employ a higher percentage of CFOs 
and other executives with tax expertise. ITF firms are also larger, more likely to operate 
in foreign jurisdictions, and more likely to use a BIG 4 auditor. Non-ITF firms tend to be 
more profitable, have relatively less leverage, and engage in acquisitions less frequently 
during the sample period. See Panel C of Table 3 for specific information on the 
statistical significance of differences across these and other control variables.
29
 The 
differences in firm characteristics between ITF and non-ITF firms suggest it is important 
to control for their effects in the multivariate tests. 
Correlations. Multicollinearity across variables was assessed through the use of 
correlation analyses and variance inflation factors (VIF). Table 4 reports both Pearson 
and Spearman correlation matrices associated with the ITF analysis (Hypotheses 1 and 
6A). Statistically significant correlations are highlighted in bold. While there are a 
number of these statistically significant correlations, none of these correlations are equal 
to or greater than 0.8. As such, the potential for multicollinearity threats is low (Kennedy, 
2008). Additionally, all variance inflation factors (VIF) range from 1.0 to 4.9, below a 
recommended VIF score of 10 (Kennedy, 2008).   
                                                 
29
 Descriptive information for Total Assets is not included in Table 3. LN_TA is instead included 
since this variable is used in the regression equation. A review of statistics for Total Assets indicates a 
significant difference (p = 0.000) in means across the two groups. Mean Total Assets for the full sample is 
$8,555 million ($8.55 billion). Mean Total Assets for companies with an ITF is $10,176 million ($10.18 







Table 4. Correlations of variables – internal tax function 
 
Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal 
  
ITF AC_ACCTG AC_LEGAL AC_TAX CFO_TAX 
OTH_EXEC





.010 .038 .052 .064 .111 -.239 .481 .065 -.124 
AC_ACCTG .010 
 
-.078 .133 .106 .018 .028 .006 -.062 -.005 
AC_LEGAL .038 -.078 
 
.130 .037 .074 .020 .139 .065 -.006 
AC_TAX .052 .133 .130 
 
.079 .033 .020 .110 -.019 -.025 
CFO_TAX .064 .106 .037 .079 
 
.013 .051 .063 -.071 .060 
OTH_EXEC_TAX .111 .018 .074 .033 .013 
 
-.048 .202 .156 -.053 
ROA -.179 .004 .001 .004 .010 -.055 
 
-.206 -.096 .219 
LN_TA .494 .015 .138 .127 .068 .188 -.177 
 
.173 -.134 
PPE_TA .078 -.068 .056 -.048 -.083 .176 -.061 .173 
 
-.092 
CHG_SALES -.144 -.021 .004 -.004 .065 -.057 .218 -.151 -.116 
 
LEV .263 .037 .034 .014 .016 .105 -.174 .427 .248 -.120 
SGA -.119 .031 -.120 .004 -.010 -.097 .088 -.233 -.417 .032 
CAPEX_PPE -.211 -.094 .027 .012 -.017 -.096 .232 -.213 -.290 .346 
FOREIGN .286 -.012 .016 -.012 .058 .075 -.121 .267 -.069 -.093 
NOL .111 .101 -.045 .036 .025 -.006 -.121 .039 -.162 .016 
BIG4 .337 .040 .029 .054 .073 .107 -.088 .369 .095 -.045 
PCT_TAXNAS .137 .117 .014 .072 -.021 -.012 .019 .156 -.053 -.041 
ACQ .123 .040 -.026 .086 .065 -.019 -.091 .148 -.183 .038 
BTM .068 .051 .067 .003 -.024 .008 -.536 .051 .049 -.109 
RD_TA .040 .021 -.105 -.015 -.017 -.039 -.001 -.066 -.223 -.001 
           Correlations significant at the 5% level are in bold. 








Table 4. Correlations of variables – internal tax function (continued) 
 
Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal 
  LEV SGA CAPEX_PPE FOREIGN NOL BIG4 PCT_TAXNAS ACQ BTM RD_TA 
ITF .235 -.131 -.250 .286 .111 .337 .060 .123 .047 -.007 
AC_ACCTG .034 .020 -.068 -.012 .101 .040 .126 .040 .045 .016 
AC_LEGAL .012 -.112 .004 .016 -.045 .029 -.017 -.026 .057 -.105 
AC_TAX .007 .012 .023 -.012 .036 .054 .057 .086 -.006 -.006 
CFO_TAX .024 -.016 .006 .058 .025 .073 -.023 .065 -.033 -.018 
OTH_EXEC_TAX .100 -.107 -.099 .075 -.006 .107 -.016 -.019 -.002 -.077 
ROA -.131 .072 .275 -.152 -.142 -.115 .031 -.142 -.472 .033 
LN_TA .347 -.233 -.254 .265 .017 .357 .070 .137 .059 -.111 
PPE_TA .226 -.420 -.215 -.120 -.137 .088 -.082 -.204 .052 -.244 
CHG_SALES -.085 .052 .313 -.076 .016 -.065 -.016 .037 -.082 .063 
LEV 
 
-.168 -.230 -.037 .087 .191 .009 .096 -.087 -.239 
SGA -.174 
 
.210 .125 .169 -.084 .099 .022 -.235 .552 
CAPEX_PPE -.250 .172 
 
-.121 .042 -.068 -.095 -.097 -.126 .073 
FOREIGN -.009 .139 -.099 
 
.144 .114 .061 .175 -.009 .172 
NOL .073 .163 .048 .144 
 
.081 .103 .095 .051 .109 
BIG4 .214 -.080 -.055 .114 .081 
 
.129 .076 -.034 -.017 
PCT_TAXNAS .072 .089 -.120 .087 .127 .177 
 
-.011 -.028 .111 
ACQ .110 .038 -.087 .175 .095 .076 .030 
 
.051 -.014 
BTM -.018 -.237 -.140 .002 .041 -.022 -.033 .063 
 
-.178 
RD_TA -.199 .513 -.010 .314 .110 -.024 .129 .058 -.158 
 
           Correlations significant at the 5% level are in bold. 






Testing ITF hypotheses (H1 and H6A). The results of Hypotheses 1 and 6A are 
presented in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. Within Table 5, I present three different 
models. Model 1 includes only control variables – the baseline model. Model 2 
incorporates the effect of the primary independent variable, ITF. Model 3 incorporates 
three additional controls related to my three categories of audit committee expertise 
(AC_TAX, AC_LEGAL, and AC_ACCTG). Coefficients for industry and year indicator 
variables are included but not reported to conserve space. 
The control model for BOOK_ETR (Table 5, Model 1) is statistically significant 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.300, p = 0.000). When the primary variable of interest ITF is added to 
the analysis (Table 5, Model 2), the overall model is statistically significant (adjusted R
2
 
= 0.303, p = 0.000) and represents a significant improvement over Model 1 (change in 
adjusted R
2
 = 0.003, p = 0.018). Additionally, the coefficient for ITF is negative and 
statistically significant (p = 0.018).
30
 This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1, which 
predicts an association between the existence of an ITF and a firm’s tax avoidance.  
Model 3 introduces the influence of audit committee expertise into the regression 
equation. Model 3 is statistically significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.304, p = 0.000); the 
improvement over Model 2 is not statistically significant (p = 0.187). The coefficient for 
ITF remains negative and significant (p = 0.019). Additionally, the coefficient for 
AC_LEGAL is positive and approaching marginal significance at p = 0.102. The 
coefficients for AC_TAX and AC_ACCTG are both negative, but neither is statistically 
significant.  
 
                                                 
30
 Note the CFO_TAX, which was negative and marginally significant in Model 1, loses 
significance in this model. Otherwise, the impact of control variables is relatively consistent across Models 






Table 5. Regression of BOOK_ETR on ITF and control variables 
BOOK_ETR = f {ITF + AC_TAX + AC_LEGAL + AC_ACCTG + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + 
LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA + CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + 











statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.389 *** 20.439 
 
0.389 *** 20.474 
 
0.388 *** 20.322 
ROA +/- 0.002 *** 3.650 
 
0.002 *** 3.538 
 
0.002 *** 3.508 
LN_TA +/- -0.012 *** -7.075 
 
-0.011 *** -6.072 
 
-0.011 *** -6.075 











CHG_SALES + -0.040 *** -3.563 
 
-0.039 *** -3.534 
 
-0.039 *** -3.529 
LEV +/- 0.037 ** 2.377 
 
0.039 *** 2.511 
 
0.040 *** 2.546 











CAPEX_PPE + 0.067 ** 1.944 
 
0.062 ** 1.794 
 
0.063 ** 1.808 











FOREIGN +/- -0.019 *** -3.008 
 
-0.017 *** -2.620 
 
-0.017 *** -2.668 
BIG4 - 0.025 *** 3.001 
 
0.028 *** 3.332 
 
0.028 *** 3.376 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.056 *** -2.668 
 
-0.057 *** -2.718 
 
-0.053 *** -2.534 











BTM - 0.038 *** 3.709 
 
0.037 *** 3.613 
 
0.037 *** 3.593 
RD_TA - -0.386 *** -5.096 
 
-0.382 *** -5.057 
 
-0.374 *** -4.942 
CFO_TAX +/- -0.016 * -1.780 
 

















    
-0.016 ** -2.372 
 
-0.015 ** -2.354 
AC_TAX +/- 





        
0.007 * 1.638 
AC_ACCTG +/- 







   
YES 
   
YES 
  Industry Dummy 
 
YES 
   
YES 
   
YES 
  Observations 
 
1400 
   
1400 
   
1400 







 Adjusted R2   0.300 
   
0.303 
   
0.304 
  *,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
    Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 










Table 6. Regression of BOOK_ETR on ITF for audit committee expertise categories 
 Panel A: Regression of BOOK_ETR on ITF for Audit Committees without Expertise 
BOOK_ETR = f {ITF + AC_TAX + AC_LEGAL + AC_ACCTG + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + 
LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA + CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + 
PCT_TAXNAS + ACQ + BTM + RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
  
AC_TAX = 0 
 
AC_LEGAL = 0 
 














Intercept +/- 0.385 *** 19.115 
 
0.388 *** 16.458 
 
0.372 *** 13.316 
ROA +/- 0.001 ** 2.386 
 
0.002 *** 3.168 
 
0.003 *** 3.476 
LN_TA +/- -0.008 *** -4.242 
 
-0.013 *** -5.981 
 
-0.012 *** -4.466 











CHG_SALES + -0.031 *** -2.691 
 
-0.041 *** -2.933 
 
-0.026 * -1.517 
LEV +/- 0.032 * 1.929 
 
0.067 *** 3.348 
 
0.058 ** 2.380 









CAPEX_PPE + 0.083 *** 2.230 
 














FOREIGN +/- -0.017 *** -2.426 
 
-0.016 ** -1.927 
 
-0.021 ** -2.343 
BIG4 - 0.026 *** 3.001 
 
0.031 *** 3.094 
 
0.049 *** 4.207 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.033 ** -1.464 
 
-0.039 * -1.558 
 
-0.163 *** -4.985 











BTM - 0.035 *** 3.160 
 
0.047 *** 3.671 
 
0.056 *** 3.658 
RD_TA - -0.358 *** -4.452 
 
-0.331 *** -3.601 
 
-0.449 *** -4.131 
CFO_TAX +/- -0.019 * -1.853 
 






















-0.028 *** -3.025 
AC_TAX +/- 








AC_LEGAL +/- 0.008 * 1.643 











    Year Dummy 
 
YES 
   
YES 






   
YES 






   
950 
   
657 







 Adjusted R2 
 
0.300 
   
0.324 
   
0.375 
  *,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
    Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 













Table 6. Regression of BOOK_ETR on ITF for audit committee expertise categories 
(continued) 
 
Panel B: Regression of BOOK_ETR on ITF for Audit Committees with Expertise 
BOOK_ETR = f {ITF + AC_TAX + AC_LEGAL + AC_ACCTG + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + 
ROA + LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA + CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 
+ PCT_TAXNAS + ACQ + BTM + RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
  
AC_TAX = 1 
 
AC_LEGAL = 1 
 





statistic   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.374 *** 4.317 
 
0.429 *** 8.705 
 
0.428 *** 15.609 









LN_TA +/- -0.025 *** -3.831 
 
-0.008 ** -2.288 
 
-0.016 *** -6.175 








-0.016 * -1.272 
CHG_SALES + -0.105 *** -3.051 
 
-0.058 *** -2.951 
 
-0.046 *** -3.082 








0.039 ** 1.811 








-0.053 ** -1.683 








0.111 *** 2.283 
NOL +/- 0.037 *** 2.567 
 
0.017 ** 2.139 
 
-0.013 ** -2.078 











BIG4 - 0.068 ** 2.186 
 
0.027 * 1.496 
 
0.020 * 1.569 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.208 *** -3.114 
 






















0.029 ** 1.985 




-0.467 *** -2.907 
 
-0.314 *** -2.918 








-0.018 * -1.641 


























-0.018 ** -2.305 
AC_LEGAL +/- -0.013 
 
-0.967 









    Year Dummy 
 
YES 
   
YES 






   
YES 






   
450 
   
743 











   
0.312 
   
0.302 
    
            *,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
    Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 






A review of coefficients for the control variables suggests that CHG_SALES, 
PCT_TAXNAS, and RD_TA are negatively associated with BOOK_ETR (p = 0.000, 
0.008, and 0.000, respectively). Results for PCT_TAXNAS and RD_TA are consistent 
with those found in prior research, but results for CHG_SALES are not in keeping with 
prior research. Additionally, I did not predict a directional relationship with respect to 
LN_TA or FOREIGN, but these variables were also negatively and significantly 
associated with BOOK_ETR (p = 0.000 and 0.003, respectively). CAPEX_PPE, BIG4, 
and BTM are positively associated with BOOK_ETR (p = 0.026, 0.002, and 0.000, 
respectively). Results for CAPEX_PPE are consistent with the expected relationship, but 
results for BIG4 and BTM are not. Although I did not predict a directional relationship 
with respect to ROA and LEV, these variables were also significantly and positively 
associated with BOOK_ETR (p = 0.000 and 0.001, respectively). 
Testing the moderating effect of audit committee expertise. Due to the limited 
number of observations within each of the audit committee expertise categories, and 
because of high multicollinearity between the terms associated with the product 
interaction term, the moderating effect of audit committee expertise will be tested using a 
subsample approach (Aiken & West, 1991) for each type of expertise. The results for 
moderation testing are presented in Table 6. Panel A presents regression results for the 
subsamples where audit committee expertise (AC_TAX, AC_LEGAL, or AC_ACCTG) 
does not exist. Panel B presents regression results for the subsamples where these types 







Companies without audit committee tax expertise. Panel A, Model 1 presents 
regression results for observations where AC_TAX = 0 (adjusted R
2
 = 0.300, p = 0.000). 
The coefficient for my main variable of interest, ITF, is negative and significant (p = 
0.001) in this model, as is the coefficient for CFO_TAX (p = 0.066). This combined 
finding suggests that, in the absence of audit committee tax expertise, a CFO with tax 
experience and the ITF engage in detectable levels of tax avoidance. Similar to results 
found in the main model, AC_LEGAL is positive and approaching marginal significance 
(p = 0.101), while AC_ACCTG is not significant.  
Companies without audit committee legal expertise. Panel A, Model 2 presents 
regression results for observations where AC_LEGAL = 0 (adjusted R
2
 = 0.324, p = 
0.000). My main variable of interest, ITF, is not statistically significant. However, the 
coefficient for CFO_TAX is negative and statistically significant (p = 0.047), which 
suggests that the CFO wields more influence on tax avoidance decisions than the ITF 
when a legal expert is not present on the audit committee.
31
 AC_TAX and AC_ACCTG 
are not significant influences on tax avoidance under this scenario.  
Companies without audit committee accounting expertise. Panel A, Model 3 
presents regression results for observations where AC_ACCTG = 0 (adjusted R
2
 = 0.375, 
p = 0.000). The coefficient on my main variable of interest, ITF, is negative and 
statistically significant in this model (p = 0.003). Coefficients for CFO_TAX, AC_TAX, 
and AC_LEGAL are not statistically significant under this scenario.  
Companies with audit committee tax expertise. Panel B, Model 1 presents 
regression results for observations where AC_TAX = 1 (adjusted R
2
 = 0.531, p = 0.000). 
                                                 
31
 Keep in mind that the CFO has ultimate financial reporting responsibility and is responsible for 
certifying the financial statements. Additionally, about 67% of senior tax executives report directly to the 






My main variable of interest, ITF, is not significant in this model. Note that this model is 
run on only 196 observations. Furthermore, there is very little variability in the ITF 
designation as 87% of companies in this subgroup have an ITF. These facts help to 
explain why the ITF variable is not significant in this particular scenario. The coefficient 
for AC_ACCTG is negative and significant (p = 0.066), which suggests that a 
combination of accounting and tax expertise on the audit committee can facilitate 
corporate tax avoidance. AC_LEGAL is not significant in this model, which suggests that 
the presence of an audit committee member with tax expertise serves to dampen the 
conservative influence of an audit committee member with legal expertise.  
Companies with audit committee legal expertise. Panel B, Model 2 presents 
regression results for observations where AC_LEGAL = 1 (adjusted R
2
 = 0.312, p = 
0.000). The coefficient for my main variable of interest, ITF, is negative and statistically 
significant in this model (p = 0.049). Significance here is less than in the main model (p = 
0.019), which suggests that a legal expert on the audit committee can dampen the 
influence of an ITF on tax avoidance. AC_ACCTG and AC_TAX are not significant.  
Companies with audit committee accounting expertise. Panel B, Model 3 presents 
regression results for observations where AC_ACCTG = 1 (adjusted R
2
 = 0.302, p = 
0.000). My main variable of interest, ITF, is not statistically significant in this model. 
However, the coefficient for CFO_TAX is negative and statistically significant (p = 
0.101), as is the coefficient for AC_TAX (p = 0.021). This result suggests that an audit 
committee accounting expert may serve to control tax avoidance generated from the ITF, 
but may defer to advice from the CFO and fellow audit committee members with tax 






model, which suggests that the presence of an audit committee member with accounting 
expertise helps to balance the conservative nature of an audit committee member with 
legal expertise (similar to the effect of tax expertise discussed above).  
A number of firm level financial controls are consistently significant across the 
audit committee moderation results reported in Table 6. LN_TA, CHG_SALES, and 
BIG4 are statistically significant and are consistent with the earlier results presented in 
Table 5. In combination, the results for the audit committee moderation tests highlight a 
complex relationship among company executives, ITF, audit committees, and corporate 
tax avoidance decisions. Audit committee expertise, depending on its nature, can serve to 
enhance or dampen the influence that an ITF or other corporate executives have on 
corporate tax avoidance. Such findings are consistent with Hypothesis 6A as audit 
committee expertise serves to moderate the relationship between the ITF and corporate 
tax avoidance. 
Supplemental analysis. I pursue a number of additional tests through 
supplemental analysis. First, I test my regression model on an alternative measure for tax 
avoidance by using uncertain tax benefits (UTB) as the dependent variable rather than 
BOOK_ETR. Then I explore a number of additional moderating relationships for the 
original BOOK_ETR regression. Variables considered in this moderator analysis include 
auditor provided tax NAS, firm size, firm profitability, and foreign operations. Finally, I 
test the influence of several additional factors, including tax litigation, tax expertise 
within the board of directors, and audit fees.
32
 The results of supplemental analysis are 
                                                 
32
 The dissertation proposal included exploration of the relationship between tax disputes and tax 
avoidance, which would have been tested through the inclusion of tax disputes as an additional control. 






discussed in detail below. Results for testing UTB as an alternative dependent variable 
are presented in Table 7. Results of other supplemental analyses have not been tabulated.  
Uncertain tax benefits as a measure of tax avoidance. Prior studies have 
used a number of alternative measures to explore tax avoidance. Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010) note that each measure can represent different aspects of a firm’s tax profile. Each 
measure may therefore capture different tax motives. Given these differences, testing of 
multiple tax avoidance measures does not always generate consistent results in research 
(e.g., Armstrong et al., 2011). To test the sensitivity of my findings, I replicate the 
analysis in Table 5 by using UTB as a measure of tax avoidance.  
Note that higher levels of UTB indicate higher levels of tax avoidance. Consistent 
with prior research (e.g., Alexander et al., 2009; Frischmann, Shevlin, & Wilson, 2008), I 
calculate my UTB tax avoidance measure as the UTB ending balance scaled by total 
assets (UTB_TA). When I substitute UTB_TA for BOOK_ETR in my full regression 
model, I obtain similar results to those presented in Table 5. Specifically, I find that ITF 
is positively and significantly related to UTB_TA (p = 0.000). Thus, an ITF is 
significantly associated with higher levels of tax avoidance when measured using 
UTB_TA. See Table 7 for full results of this analysis. 
Auditor-provided tax services (Tax NAS). Regulators argue that economic 
bonding results from the significant non-audit fees paid to auditors by their clients and 
that this economic bonding impairs the auditor’s ability to independently attest to the 
financial statements. Correspondingly, SOX (2002) and the PCAOB (2005) sought to 
limit non-audit services provided by the auditor. While tax consulting remains among the 






Table 7. Regression of UTB_TA on ITF and control variables 
 
UTB_TA = f {ITF + AC_TAX + AC_LEGAL + AC_ACCTG + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA + 
LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA + CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + 
PCT_TAXNAS + ACQ + BTM + RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
 
Variable   
Expected 




















































































































































  Year Dummy 
   
YES 
     Industry Dummy 
   
YES 
     Observations 
   
1235 
     F-statistic 
   
3.848 *** 
    Adjusted R2     
 
0.141 
     *,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
   
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, two-tailed otherwise. 







its auditor for tax-related services (PCAOB, 2005) and also specify detailed requirements 
for the approval and disclosure of these services to the extent they are allowed (Sarbanes 
& Oxley, 2002).  
Audit practitioners and researchers have argued that knowledge spillovers 
associated with the provision of NAS may lead to certain financial reporting benefits. 
Specific benefits of auditor-provided tax NAS may include improved financial reporting 
quality (e.g., Gleason & Mills, 2011; G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2011), reduced 
audit fees (Donohoe & Knechel, 2009), and shorter audit lags (Knechel & Sharma, 2012). 
I further explore the knowledge-spillover versus economic bonding controversy by 
considering how the provision of tax services by the audit firm influences the relationship 
between the ITF and BOOK_ETR. Using an indicator variable, I segregate the sample 
into companies that purchase tax services from the auditor and those that do not purchase 
tax services from the auditor and analyze these subsamples separately.  
When the auditor does not provide tax services, I find that a number of expert 
variables are significant. Untabulated coefficients for ITF, CFO_TAX, and 
OTH_EXEC_TAX are all negative and statistically significant, as is AC_ACCTG (p = 
0.016, 0.004, 0.048, and 0.063, respectively). AC_LEGAL is positive and statistically 
significant (p = 0.008). While AC_TAX is not significant in this scenario, the lack of 
results may partially be explained by the fact that only 11% of companies in this 
subsample have an audit committee member with tax expertise. Thus, there may not be 
enough variability in this measure to capture its effect.  
When the auditor does provide tax services, none of the above expertise variables 






become significant. Specifically, coefficients for FOREIGN (p = 0.002) and RD_TA (p = 
0.000) are both negative and statistically significant when tax NAS = 1, but not when tax 
NAS = 0. 
Firm size. Primary tests include all companies in the sample, regardless of size. 
However, prior research (e.g., Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Mills et al., 1998; Phillips, 
2003; Robinson et al., 2010) suggests that firm size influences tax avoidance. Firm size, 
for example, may be representative of economies of scale associated with tax planning 
which lead to increased tax avoidance. An analysis of the full sample, which is presented 
in Table 5, supports this argument as results indicate that firm size is significantly and 
negatively related to BOOK_ETR. However, results of prior research have been mixed 
with regard to this relationship. In an effort to resolve these inconsistencies and further 
test this relationship, I segregate the sample into small and large companies using the 
median value of firm size as a cut-off point. I then separately analyze statistical results for 
these two groups.  
I find that an ITF is negatively and significantly related to tax avoidance in small 
firms (p = 0.000), but not in large firms. Alternatively, an audit committee member with 
tax expertise (AC_TAX) is negatively and significantly related to tax avoidance in large 
firms (p = 0.059), but not in small firms. Because 96% of large companies have an ITF, 
there is little variability from firm to firm with regard to this type of tax expertise. This 
fact may serve to explain the lack of significance with regard to ITF. However, the 
significance of AC_TAX may indicate that larger firms have greater access to other tax 







Foreign Operations. The connection between foreign operations and tax 
avoidance has been extensively explored in tax avoidance research, although results on 
the relationship have been mixed (e.g., Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009; Markle & Shackelford, 
2010; Rego, 2003). Firms with foreign operations are subject to tax laws and treaties 
across multiple countries. This complex situation can result in extensive tax saving 
opportunities through the use of tax havens (e.g., Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009) and similar 
strategies, or can lead to double-taxation (e.g., Markle & Shackelford, 2010). Within the 
results of my full regression analysis as reported in Table 5, I find that foreign operations 
are significantly and negatively related to BOOK_ETR. I also find that 84% of firms with 
an ITF have foreign operations, while only 54% of firms without an ITF have foreign 
operations.  
Given these differences, I explore the relationship across an ITF, foreign 
operations, and BOOK_ETR more extensively. I use the FOREIGN indicator variable to 
analyze the tax avoidance relationship across companies with and without foreign 
operations. When the ITF variable is included in the analysis, I find that an ITF is 
negatively and significantly related to tax avoidance in firms that have foreign operations 
(p =0.003), but it is not significant for firms that do not have foreign operations. This 
result seems logical as a firm without foreign operations may have a less complex tax 
posture since it is taxed in only one country. Transfer pricing and tax haven opportunities 
may be less extensive, and, without risk of double taxation, the firm may have a reduced 
need to invest in tax saving strategies. 
Firm Profitability. Much tax avoidance research is focused on profitable firms 






al., 2012). However, profitability can vary, and prior research is mixed with respect to the 
directional relationship between profitability and tax avoidance. An analysis of the full 
sample, results of which are presented in Table 5, indicates that profitability is 
significantly and positively related to BOOK_ETR.  
In an effort to resolve discrepancies in prior research, I explore the relationship 
between corporate profits and tax avoidance by segregating my sample into firms with 
high profits and those with low profits. I use the median value of pretax income as a cut-
off point and find that ITF is negatively and significantly related to tax avoidance in firms 
that are classified as low profit (p =0.072), but not those classified as high profit. 
Similarly to the ITF composition of large firms, approximately 95% of high profit firms 
have an ITF. Thus, the lack of a statistically significant association between ITF and tax 
avoidance in large firms may be attributable to limited variance with respect to this 
variable. 
Additional factors. While the empirical models tested here include a multitude 
of control variables, there are other variables not yet considered that could influence tax 
avoidance. I perform additional analysis that includes three such variables: (1) tax 
litigation, (2) board of directors (BOD) tax expertise, and (3) audit fees.
33
 
Tax litigation. Because previous concerns over a firm’s tax positions may 
influence its current tax avoidance behavior, I consider prior tax litigation (LITIG_3yr). 
LITIG_3yr equals 1 if the firm or its auditors have been involved in tax-related litigation 
                                                 
33
 Prior research also demonstrates an association between performance/compensation measures 
and tax avoidance (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 2010). However, due to the proprietary 






within the last three years and 0 otherwise. 
34
 A positive coefficient would suggest that a 
firm may have experienced unfavorable resolution of prior tax litigation and is therefore 
more conservative in its current tax avoidance behavior. Conversely, if a firm has 
experienced favorable resolution from litigation (i.e. its prior tax positions were 
confirmed under a detailed review by the legal courts), effective tax rates may be 
negatively influenced by these factors, or not at all. Within the current sample, 
LITIG_3yr is not significant, which is consistent with this last explanation. 
Board of directors’ tax expertise. In my primary analyses, I consider the direct 
influence of audit committee expertise on tax avoidance as well as its moderating 
influence on the relationship between ITF and tax avoidance. Because board members 
who are not on the audit committee may similarly influence tax strategy decisions, I also 
explore the relationship between tax avoidance and board of director tax expertise. BOD 
tax expertise (BODonly_TAX) is an indicator variable equal to 1 when a firm has one or 
more board members who are not on the audit committee but who are considered tax 
experts.
35
 I find that BODonly_TAX is not significantly associated with tax avoidance. 
Audit fees. Given the significant regulatory and academic focus on the 
relationship between the audit firm and tax avoidance, I investigate how audit fees may 
affect the relationship between ITF and tax avoidance. The audit fee variable 
(AUDFEE_RATIO) is calculated as the percent of audit fees to total fees paid to the 
auditor for all services. The coefficient for AUDFEE_RATIO, when added to the main 
regression model for ETR, is negative and statistically significant (p = 0.005). However, 
                                                 
34
 Approximately 10% of firms in the sample (133 out of 1,400) were engaged in tax-related 
litigation at some point in the prior three years.  
35
 Approximately 6% of companies in the sample (90 out of 1,400) have a board member with tax 






with the addition of this variable along with LITIG_3yr and BODonly_Tax, the 
coefficient for ITF remains negative and significant (p = 0.004). Thus, these additional 
factors do not significantly alter the relationship between BOOK_ETR and my primary 
variable of interest, ITF. 
Tax Avoidance and Characteristics of the In-House Tax Expert (IHTE) 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis. Table 8 presents descriptive 
statistics related to the background characteristics of in-house tax experts. I include 
information for only those companies with an ITF, as well as information for the full 
sample of companies with and without an ITF. A review of IHTE descriptives indicates 
that 63.35% (35.43%) of the ITF (full) sample held CPA certification, while 6.00% 
(3.36%) were certified attorneys. Approximately 1.79% (1.00%) of the ITF (full) sample 
held some other form of certification such as a CMA or CIA. However, due to the limited 
presence of these certifications, I was unable to test the influence of other certifications in 
the ETR regressions.  
Of the four graduate degrees observed, an MTX or similar degree was most 
prevalent with 28.73% (17.07%) of the ITF (full) sample holding this degree. 
Approximately 25.36% (15.07%) of the ITF (full) sample earned law degrees. MACC or 
similar degrees were held by 13.10% (7.79%) of IHTEs, while MBAs were held by 
12.14% (7.21%) of IHTEs in the ITF (full) sample.  
Male IHTEs represented 77.18% (59.93%) of the ITF (full) sample. Female 
IHTEs represented 22.91% (17.79%) of the ITF (full) sample. Average experience of 







Table 8. Descriptive statistics - IHTE characteristics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
        
  
 ITF Sample^  
 
 Full Sample  
 
 Number of 
Observations   Mean   SD  
 
 Number of 
Observations   Mean   SD  
 
Experience 604 21.87 7.11 
 
1400 15.65 11.56 
         
         Panel B: Descriptive statistics for categorical variables 
    
  
 ITF Sample^  
 
 Full Sample (n = 1400)  
  
 Number of 
Observations  
 # Present 
in Sample  
 % of 
Sample  
 
 Number of 
Observations  
 # Present 
in Sample  
 % of 
Sample  
 
CERT_ATTY 783 47 6.00% 
 
1400 47 3.36% 
 
CPA 783 496 63.35% 
 
1400 496 35.43% 
 
ALLOTH_CERT 783 14 1.79% 
 
1400 14 1.00% 
 
MACC 832 109 13.10% 
 
1400 109 7.79% 
 
MTX 832 239 28.73% 
 
1400 239 17.07% 
 
MBA 832 101 12.14% 
 
1400 101 7.21% 
 
LAW 832 211 25.36% 
 
1400 211 15.07% 
 
MALE 1087 839 77.18% 
 
1400 839 59.93% 
 
FEMALE 1087 249 22.91% 
 
1400 249 17.79% 
         
         
         
         ^ Relevant ITF sample only includes observations for which there is valid data. Missing values have been 
excluded from the sample size shown 







Correlations. Multicollinearity across variables was assessed through the use of 
correlation and VIF analyses. Table 9 reports both Pearson and Spearman correlation 
matrices associated with the IHTE-specific variables that encompass certification, 
education, gender, and experience (Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, 5). Statistically significant 
correlations are highlighted in bold. While there are a number of these statistically 
significant correlations, none of these correlations are equal to or greater than 0.8. As 
such, the correlations are not deemed significant enough to present multicollinearity 
issues (Kennedy, 2008). In addition, variance inflation factors (VIF) are generally below 
the recommended VIF score of 10 (Kennedy, 2008) for the various regression equations. 
There are, however, some exceptions to this statement. Where exceptions exist, they are 
discussed in detail below.  
Testing IHTE hypotheses (H2, H3, H4, H5, and H6B). The results of 
Hypotheses 2 through 5 are presented in Tables 10 through 13, respectively. Within each 
of these tables, I present two panels, each with three different models. Panel A presents 
regression results on only those companies that have ITFs. Panel B presents regression 
results on the full sample of companies. Note that the sample size varies across each of 
the four characteristics of interest due to missing data.  
Model 1 within each panel includes only control variables – the baseline model. 
Model 2 incorporates the effect of the primary independent variable, one of the four 
background characteristics of interest. Model 3 incorporates three additional controls 
related specifically to my three categories of audit committee expertise (AC_TAX, 
AC_LEGAL, and AC_ACCTG). Coefficients for industry and year indicator variables 







Table 9. Correlations of variables - IHTE characteristics 
Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal 
  
CERT_ATTY CPA MACC MTX MBA LAW MALE LN_EXPERIENCE 
CERT_ATTY 
 -.035 .161 -.083 -.073 .446 .121 .120 
CPA 
-.035  .150 .234 .071 .017 .407 .574 
MACC 
.161 .150  -.150 -.108 -.003 .106 .196 
MTX 
-.083 .234 -.150  -.034 -.186 .223 .348 
MBA 
-.073 .071 -.108 -.034  -.023 .140 .194 
LAW 
.446 .017 -.003 -.186 -.023  .234 .281 
MALE 
.121 .407 .106 .223 .140 .234  .714 
LN_EXPERIENCE 
.108 .455 .119 .285 .199 .288 .646  
         Correlations significant at the 5% level are in bold. 





Table 10. Regression of BOOK_ETR on certification and control variables 
PANEL A - Certification for ITF = 1 Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {CERT_ATTY + CPA + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + 
OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + 











statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.384 *** 13.295 
 
0.391 *** 13.102 
 
0.392 *** 13.039 
ROA +/- 0.002 * 1.891 
 
0.002 * 1.845 
 
0.002 * 1.901 
LN_TA +/- -0.011 *** -4.716 
 
-0.012 *** -5.031 
 
-0.012 *** -5.040 











CHG_SALES + -0.050 *** -3.122 
 
-0.051 *** -3.192 
 
-0.051 *** -3.171 
LEV +/- 0.041 * 1.832 
 
0.043 * 1.902 
 
0.044 ** 1.930 











CAPEX_PPE + 0.091 ** 1.687 
 
0.088 ** 1.632 
 
0.087 * 1.598 











FOREIGN +/- -0.031 *** -2.844 
 
-0.032 *** -2.929 
 
-0.031 *** -2.884 
BIG4 - 0.023 ** 1.644 
 
0.025 ** 1.750 
 
0.025 ** 1.771 






















BTM - 0.046 *** 2.984 
 
0.044 *** 2.868 
 
0.046 *** 2.995 
RD_TA - -0.350 *** -3.115 
 
-0.342 *** -3.015 
 
-0.333 *** -2.924 























    
0.024 * 1.858 
 
0.022 * 1.704 
CPA +/- 


























   
YES 






   
YES 






   
783 
   
783 







 Adjusted R2 
 
0.277 
   
0.278 
   
0.277 
  
               
            *, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
    Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 




Table 10. Regression of BOOK_ETR on certification and control variables (continued) 
PANEL B - Certification for Full Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {CERT_ATTY + CPA + ITF + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + 
OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + 











statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.424 *** 19.503 
 
0.430 *** 19.521 
 
0.428 *** 19.240 
ROA +/- 0.001 ** 2.229 
 
0.001 ** 2.171 
 
0.001 ** 2.255 
LN_TA +/- -0.012 *** -6.063 
 
-0.013 *** -6.335 
 
-0.013 *** -6.336 
PPE_TA - -0.019 ** -1.805 
 
-0.019 ** -1.857 
 
-0.019 ** -1.783 
CHG_SALES + -0.056 *** -4.294 
 
-0.057 *** -4.367 
 
-0.056 *** -4.340 
LEV +/- 0.034 * 1.840 
 
0.037 ** 1.959 
 
0.037 ** 2.002 
SGA + -0.044 ** -1.772 
 
-0.047 ** -1.856 
 
-0.045 ** -1.784 
CAPEX_PPE + 0.074 ** 1.825 
 
0.073 ** 1.802 
 
0.075 ** 1.815 











FOREIGN +/- -0.019 *** -2.555 
 
-0.020 *** -2.598 
 
-0.020 *** -2.593 
BIG4 - 0.025 *** 2.792 
 
0.026 *** 2.900 
 
0.026 *** 2.946 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.072 *** -2.921 
 
-0.069 *** -2.808 
 
-0.063 *** -2.530 











BTM - 0.033 *** 2.676 
 
0.032 *** 2.584 
 
0.034 *** 2.739 
RD_TA - -0.357 *** -3.979 
 
-0.352 *** -3.917 
 
-0.344 *** -3.812 
































    
0.023 * 1.888 
 
0.021 * 1.677 
CPA +/- 


























   
YES 






   
YES 






   
1024 
   
1024 







 Adjusted R2 
 
0.299 
   
0.300 
   
0.301 
    
            *, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
    Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 






Table 11. Regression of BOOK_ETR on education and control variables 
PANEL A - Education for ITF = 1 Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {MACC + MTX + MBA + LAW + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + 
CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + 










d Sign Estimate 
t-
statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.361 *** 11.143 
 
0.364 *** 10.853 
 
0.365 *** 10.799 











LN_TA +/- -0.010 *** -4.311 
 
-0.009 *** -3.787 
 
-0.010 *** -3.802 











CHG_SALES + -0.041 *** -2.639 
 
-0.041 *** -2.624 
 
-0.040 *** -2.609 
LEV +/- 0.048 ** 2.239 
 
0.047 ** 2.218 
 
0.049 ** 2.281 






















NOL +/- -0.011 * -1.753 
 





FOREIGN +/- -0.028 *** -2.638 
 
-0.028 *** -2.594 
 
-0.028 *** -2.609 

































BTM - 0.037 *** 2.521 
 
0.036 *** 2.432 
 
0.037 *** 2.489 
RD_TA - -0.341 *** -3.237 
 
-0.334 *** -3.157 
 
-0.330 *** -3.101 












































































   
YES 






   
YES 






   
832 
   
832 







 Adjusted R2 
 
0.269 
   
0.266 
   
0.265 
    
            *,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
    Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 






Table 11. Regression of BOOK_ETR on education and control variables (continued) 
PANEL B - Education for Full Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {MACC + MTX + MBA + LAW + ITF + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + 
CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + 












statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.417 *** 19.317 
 
0.416 *** 18.943 
 
0.414 *** 18.650 
ROA +/- 0.001 ** 2.026 
 
0.001 ** 1.950 
 
0.001 ** 1.975 
LN_TA +/- -0.011 *** -5.541 
 
-0.011 *** -4.897 
 
-0.011 *** -4.867 









CHG_SALES + -0.048 *** -3.816 
 
-0.048 *** -3.814 
 
-0.048 *** -3.812 
LEV +/- 0.041 ** 2.315 
 
0.041 ** 2.292 
 
0.042 ** 2.358 

































FOREIGN +/- -0.018 ** -2.448 
 
-0.018 ** -2.437 
 
-0.019 *** -2.460 
BIG4 - 0.020 *** 2.269 
 
0.020 ** 2.170 
 
0.020 *** 2.247 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.066 *** -2.687 
 
-0.069 *** -2.761 
 
-0.064 *** -2.553 











BTM - 0.028 *** 2.321 
 
0.027 *** 2.216 
 
0.028 *** 2.277 
RD_TA - -0.335 *** -3.896 
 
-0.332 *** -3.841 
 
-0.325 *** -3.766 











CFO_TAX +/- -0.021 ** -2.078 
 
-0.019 * -1.868 
 
-0.018 * -1.754 































































   
YES 






   
YES 






   
1073 
   
1073 







 Adjusted R2 
 
0.289 
   
0.287 
   
0.288 
  *, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels respectively. 
    
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definition. 






Table 12. Regression of BOOK_ETR on experience and control variables 
PANEL A - Experience for ITF = 1 Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {LN_EXPERIENCE + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + 
OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + 











statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.396 *** 11.875 
 
0.429 *** 9.660 
 
0.433 *** 9.683 











LN_TA +/- -0.012 *** -3.958 
 
-0.011 *** -3.418 
 
-0.011 *** -3.396 











CHG_SALES + -0.058 *** -3.272 
 
-0.058 *** -3.265 
 
-0.058 *** -3.247 
LEV +/- 0.091 *** 3.631 
 
0.090 *** 3.597 
 
0.091 *** 3.614 











CAPEX_PPE + 0.081 * 1.278 
 
















FOREIGN +/- -0.039 *** -3.164 
 
-0.039 *** -3.182 
 
-0.041 *** -3.279 

































BTM - 0.050 *** 2.936 
 
0.048 *** 2.827 
 
0.050 *** 2.894 
RD_TA - -0.254 ** -1.991 
 
-0.250 ** -1.955 
 
-0.253 ** -1.969 
OTH_EXEC_TAX +/- -0.017 * -1.752 
 
-0.017 * -1.686 
 
-0.017 * -1.692 






































   
YES 






   
YES 






   
604 
   
604 







 Adjusted R2 
 
0.283 
   
0.283 
   
0.281 
    
            *, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
    Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 






Table 12. Regression of BOOK_ETR on experience and control variables (continued) 
PANEL B - Experience for Full Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {LN_EXPERIENCE + ITF + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + 
OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + 











statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.434 *** 18.020 
 
0.433 *** 17.927 
 
0.433 *** 17.732 











LN_TA +/- -0.013 *** -5.222 
 
-0.012 *** -4.763 
 
-0.012 *** -4.714 
PPE_TA - -0.024 ** -1.961 
 
-0.024 ** -1.952 
 
-0.024 ** -1.943 
CHG_SALES + -0.063 *** -4.520 
 
-0.063 *** -4.523 
 
-0.063 *** -4.534 
LEV +/- 0.072 *** 3.572 
 
0.071 *** 3.547 
 
0.072 *** 3.581 
SGA + -0.035 * -1.292 
 
-0.035 * -1.284 
 
-0.035 * -1.277 
CAPEX_PPE + 0.068 * 1.517 
 
0.069 * 1.530 
 
0.070 * 1.549 











FOREIGN +/- -0.024 *** -2.968 
 
-0.025 *** -3.004 
 
-0.025 *** -3.061 
BIG4 - 0.023 *** 2.469 
 
0.022 *** 2.308 
 
0.022 *** 2.329 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.073 *** -2.616 
 
-0.074 *** -2.638 
 
-0.069 *** -2.436 











BTM - 0.033 *** 2.495 
 
0.032 *** 2.420 
 
0.034 *** 2.481 
RD_TA - -0.274 *** -2.807 
 
-0.272 *** -2.783 
 
-0.269 *** -2.747 











CFO_TAX +/- -0.022 * -1.827 
 
-0.022 * -1.840 
 
-0.020 * -1.665 






































   
YES 






   
YES 






   
845 
   
845 







 Adjusted R2 
 
0.293 
   
0.292 
   
0.291 
    
            *,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
    Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 






Table 13. Regression of BOOK_ETR on gender and control variables 
PANEL A - Gender for ITF = 1 Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {MALE + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX 
+ LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + CHG_SALES + 











statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.356 *** 14.612 
 
0.355 *** 14.393 
 
0.359 *** 14.464 
ROA +/- 0.002 *** 3.694 
 
0.002 *** 3.693 
 
0.002 *** 3.632 
LN_TA +/- -0.011 *** -5.524 
 
-0.011 *** -5.508 
 
-0.011 *** -5.550 











CHG_SALES + -0.034 *** -2.577 
 
-0.034 *** -2.575 
 
-0.033 *** -2.514 
LEV +/- 0.045 ** 2.432 
 
0.045 ** 2.431 
 
0.046 *** 2.481 






















NOL +/- -0.008 * -1.628 
 





FOREIGN +/- -0.024 *** -2.836 
 
-0.024 *** -2.832 
 
-0.024 *** -2.895 
BIG4 - 0.029 *** 2.322 
 
0.029 *** 2.318 
 
0.028 *** 2.262 






















BTM - 0.052 *** 4.305 
 
0.052 *** 4.299 
 
0.052 *** 4.234 
RD_TA - -0.360 *** -4.106 
 
-0.361 *** -4.103 
 
-0.353 *** -3.993 











CFO_TAX +/- -0.018 * -1.869 
 
-0.018 * -1.868 
 
-0.017 * -1.713 
MALE +/- 


























   
YES 






   
YES 






   
1087 
   
1087 







 Adjusted R2 
 
0.302 
   
0.301 
   
0.302 
    
            *,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
    Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 







Table 13. Regression of BOOK_ETR on gender and control variables (continued) 
PANEL B - Gender for Full Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {MALE + ITF + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + 
OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + 











statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic   Estimate 
t-
statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.400 *** 20.666 
 
0.400 *** 20.647 
 
0.400 *** 20.563 
ROA +/- 0.002 *** 3.712 
 
0.002 *** 3.709 
 
0.002 *** 3.657 
LN_TA +/- -0.012 *** -6.580 
 
-0.012 *** -6.541 
 
-0.012 *** -6.581 











CHG_SALES + -0.040 *** -3.563 
 
-0.040 *** -3.552 
 
-0.040 *** -3.501 
LEV +/- 0.040 *** 2.509 
 
0.040 *** 2.506 
 
0.041 *** 2.527 

































FOREIGN +/- -0.017 *** -2.605 
 
-0.017 *** -2.587 
 
-0.018 *** -2.680 
BIG4 - 0.027 *** 3.199 
 
0.027 *** 3.186 
 
0.027 *** 3.243 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.048 *** -2.273 
 
-0.048 *** -2.277 
 
-0.043 ** -1.995 











BTM - 0.041 *** 3.878 
 
0.041 *** 3.863 
 
0.040 *** 3.806 
RD_TA - -0.362 *** -4.788 
 
-0.362 *** -4.780 
 
-0.353 *** -4.666 











CFO_TAX +/- -0.019 ** -2.055 
 
-0.019 ** -2.048 
 
-0.017 * -1.859 
ITF +/- -0.015 ** -2.220 
 
-0.014 * -1.806 
 
-0.013 * -1.714 
MALE +/- 



















        




   
YES 






   
YES 






   
1328 
   
1328 







 Adjusted R2 
 
0.315 
   
0.315 
   
0.318 
    
            *,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
    Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 






characteristic is tested separately in an effort to maintain adequate sample size and power 
for each of the regression tests. 
The results of testing Hypothesis 6B are present in Tables 14 through 17. As with 
the moderation analysis on ITF, the moderating effect of audit committee expertise is 
tested using a subsample approach (Aiken & West, 1991). To maintain sample size, I 
again test each background characteristic separately. Panel A presents results for tests of 
the ITF = 1 sample, while Panel B presents results for the full sample. 
Testing IHTE certification. The control model for the ITF sample (Table 10, 
Panel A, Model 1) is statistically significant (R
2
 = 0.277, p = 0.000). When variables for 
certification (i.e., CERT_ATTY and CPA) are added to the analysis (Table 10, Panel A, 
Model 2), the overall model is statistically significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.278, p = 0.000) 
but does not represent a significant improvement over Model 1 (change in adjusted R
2
 = 
0.001, p = 0.178). However, the coefficient for CERT_ATTY is positive and statistically 
significant (p = 0.064). The coefficient of CPA is not significant. Given the significant 
association between ETR and CERT_ATTY, the null hypothesis associated with 
certification (Hypothesis 2) is rejected. 
Model 3 (Table 10, Panel A, Model 3) introduces the influence of audit 
committee expertise into the regression equation. Model 3 is statistically significant 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.277, p= 0.000), but does not improve over Model 2. The coefficient for 
CERT_ATTY remains positive and statistically significant (p = 0.089), while the 
coefficient for CPA remains non-significant. The coefficient for AC_LEGAL is positive, 
and the coefficients for AC_TAX and AC_ACCTG are both negative. No audit 






When the analysis is expanded to include the full sample of firms with and 
without an ITF (Table 10, Panel B), similar results are obtained. Model 1 (the control 
variable model) is again statistically significant (R
2
 = 0.299, p = 0.000). When variables 
for certification (i.e., CERT_ATTY and CPA) are added to the analysis of the full sample 
(Table 10, Panel B, Model 2), the overall model is statistically significant (adjusted R
2
 = 
0.300, p = 0.000) but does not represent a significant improvement over Model 1 (change 
in adjusted R
2
 = 0.001, p = 0.166). Additionally, the coefficient for CERT_ATTY is 
positive and statistically significant (p = 0.059). The coefficient of CPA is not significant. 
As a result, the null hypothesis associated with certification (Hypothesis 2) is again 
rejected. 
Model 3 introduces the influence of audit committee expertise into the full sample 
regression equation. As with the ITF sample, Model 3 is statistically significant (adjusted 
R
2
 = 0.301, p= 0.000); the improvement over Model 2 is not statistically significant (p = 
0.325). The coefficient for CERT_ATTY remains positive and statistically significant (p 
= 0.094), while the coefficient for CPA remains non-significant. AC_LEGAL, AC_TAX, 
and AC_ACCTG are not significantly associated with BOOK_ETR in this equation.  
A number of control variables are consistently significant across models for the 
ITF and full samples. LN_TA, CHG_SALES, FOREIGN, and RD_TA are negatively 
associated with BOOK_ETR, while ROA, LEV, CAPEX_PPE, BIG4, and BTM are 
positively associated with BOOK_ETR. Results are consistent with those obtained in the 
ITF tests presented in Table 5. Overall, the evidence from the certification analyses 
suggests that an IHTE who is a certified attorney is positively associated with 






Testing IHTE education. The control model for the ITF sample (Table 11, Panel 
A, Model 1) is statistically significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.269, p = 0.000). When variables 
for education (i.e., MACC, MTX, MBA, and LAW) are added to the analysis (Table 11, 
Panel A, Model 2), the overall model is statistically significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.266, p = 
0.000) but does not represent an improvement over Model 1. Additionally, the coefficient 
for each of the education variables is negative (or 0.000). However, no variable is 
statistically significant. As a result, Hypothesis 3, which predicted an association between 
an IHTE’s education and tax avoidance, is not upheld. 
Model 3 (Table 11, Panel A, Model 3) introduces the influence of audit 
committee expertise into the education regression equation. Model 3 is statistically 
significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.265, p = 0.000) but again does not improve over either of the 
prior two models. The coefficients for all education variables remain non-significant. The 
coefficient for AC_LEGAL is positive, and the coefficients for AC_TAX and 
AC_ACCTG are both negative. No audit committee expertise variable is significant in 
this equation.   
When the analysis is expanded to include the full sample of firms with and 
without an ITF (Table 11, Panel B), similar results are obtained. Model 1 (the control 
variable model) is again statistically significant (R
2
 = 0.289, p = 0.000). When variables 
for certification (i.e., MACC, MTX, MBA, and LAW) are added to the analysis of the 
full sample (Table 11, Panel B, Model 2), the overall model is statistically significant 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.287, p = 0.000) but does not represent an improvement over Model 1. 
Additionally, no education variables are statistically significant in the equation. As with 






Model 3 introduces the influence of audit committee expertise into the full sample 
regression equation. Similar to the ITF sample, Model 3 is statistically significant 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.288, p = 0.000); the improvement over Model 2 is not statistically 
significant (p = 0.241). The coefficients for all education variables are again not 
significant. The coefficients for AC_LEGAL, AC_TAX, and AC_ACCTG are not 
significantly associated with BOOK_ETR in this equation.  
Several coefficients for control variables are statistically significant across both 
the ITF and full samples. LN_TA, CHG_SALES, FOREIGN, and RD_TA are negatively 
associated with BOOK_ETR. LEV and BTM are positively associated with BOOK_ETR. 
Directional results for these variables are consistent with the results reported in Table 5 
for testing of the ITF hypothesis.  
With education, I also considered a combination of variables, results of which 
have not been tabulated. First, because IHTEs with a MACC degree may elect a tax 
concentration, I combined MACC and MTX degree holders. No education variables were 
significant under this new scenario for either the ITF or full samples. Next, because 
IHTEs with MBAs may have opted for an accounting concentration, I combined MACC, 
MTX, and MBA degrees. Again, no education variables were significant under this 
scenario in either sample.  
Finally, because prior experimental research in tax suggests differences in 
judgments between individuals with undergraduate versus graduate degrees (Chang & 
McCarty, 1988), I also combine all degrees (MACC, MTX, MBA, and LAW) into one 
graduate degree variable. No education variables were significant under this scenario 






and a variety of subsamples. Overall, the results of the education analysis suggest that 
differences in IHTE education are not associated with BOOK_ETR. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported.   
Testing IHTE experience. The control model for the ITF sample (Table 12, Panel 
A, Model 1) is statistically significant (R
2
 = 0.283, p = 0.000). When LN_EXPERIENCE 
is added to the analysis (Table 12, Panel A, Model 2), the overall model is statistically 
significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.283, p = 0.000) but does not improve upon Model 1 as there 
is no change in adjusted R
2
. Additionally, the coefficient for LN_EXPERIENCE is 
negative but not statistically significant (p = 0.270). As a result, the null hypothesis 
associated with experience (Hypothesis 4) cannot be rejected. 
Model 3 (Table 12, Panel A, Model 3) introduces the influence of audit 
committee expertise into the regression equation. Model 3 is statistically significant 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.281, p = 0.000), but does not improve upon Models 1 and 2. The 
coefficient for LN_EXPERIENCE is not significant. The coefficients for AC_LEGAL 
and AC_TAX are positive, and the coefficient for AC_ACCTG is negative. No audit 
committee expertise variable is significant in this equation.  
When the analysis is expanded to include the full sample of firms with and 
without an ITF (Table 12, Panel B), similar results are obtained. Model 1 (the control 
variable model) is again statistically significant (R
2
 = 0.293, p = 0.000). When 
LN_EXPERIENCE is added to the analysis of the full sample (Table 12, Panel B, Model 
2), the overall model is statistically significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.292, p = 0.000) but does 








 As with the ITF sample, the null hypothesis associated with 
experience (Hypothesis 4) cannot be rejected. 
Model 3 introduces the influence of audit committee expertise into the full sample 
regression equation. As with the ITF sample, Model 3 is statistically significant (adjusted 
R
2
 = 0.291, p = 0.000); Model 3 does not improve upon the previous two models. The 
coefficient for LN_EXPERIENCE is not significant. The AC_LEGAL, AC_TAX, and 
AC_ACCTG are not significantly associated with BOOK_ETR in this equation.  
Several control variables are statistically significant for experience tests on the 
ITF and full samples. LN_TA, CHG_SALES, FOREIGN, and RD_TA are negatively 
associated with BOOK_ETR, while LEV and BTM are positively associated with 
BOOK_ETR. These results are consistent with control variable effects reported in Table 
5. Overall, the results of the experience analysis suggest that an IHTE’s experience level 
is not associated with BOOK_ETR. As a result, Hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected.  
Testing IHTE gender. The control model for the ITF sample (Table 13, Panel A, 
Model 1) is statistically significant (R
2
 = 0.302, p = 0.000). When the gender variable, 
MALE, is added to the analysis (Table 13, Panel A, Model 2), the overall model is 
statistically significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.301, p = 0.000) but does not represent an 
improvement over Model 1. Additionally, the coefficient for MALE is not statistically 
significant. As a result, the null hypothesis associated with gender (Hypothesis 5) cannot 
be rejected.  
                                                 
36
 With this particular test, experience and ITF displayed high VIFs (in excess of 10.0), indicating 
a significant amount of correlation between these two variables. Such a correlation is logical since most 
IHTEs would have a significant amount of experience. This issue was not present in testing on the ITF 






Model 3 (Table 13, Panel A, Model 3) introduces the influence of audit 
committee expertise into the gender regression equation. Model 3 is statistically 
significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.302, p= 0.000) but is not a significant improvement over the 
prior two models. The coefficient for MALE remains non-significant. The coefficient for 
AC_LEGAL is positive, and the coefficients for AC_TAX and AC_ACCTG are both 
negative. No audit committee expertise variable is significant in this equation.  
When the analysis is expanded to include the full sample of firms with and 
without an ITF (Table 13, Panel B), similar results are obtained in the control model as 
Model 1 is again statistically significant (R
2
 = 0.315, p = 0.000). When the gender 
variable MALE is added to the analysis of the full sample (Table 13, Panel B, Model 2), 
the overall model is statistically significant (adjusted R
2
 = 0.315, p = 0.000) but does not 
represent an improvement over Model 1. As with the ITF sample, MALE is not 
statistically significant. Again, the null hypothesis associated with gender (Hypothesis 5) 
cannot be rejected. 
Model 3 introduces the influence of audit committee expertise into the full sample 
regression equation. Similar to the ITF sample, Model 3 is statistically significant 
(adjusted R
2
 = 0.318, p = 0.000). Model 3 is a statistically significant improvement over 
Model 2 (change in adjusted R
2
 = 0.003, p = 0.047). The coefficient for MALE remains 
non-significant. The coefficients for AC_TAX and AC_ACCTG are not significantly 
associated with BOOK_ETR in this equation. However, the coefficient for AC_LEGAL 
is positive and statistically significant (p = 0.043).  
Numerous control variable coefficients are significant in the ITF and full sample 






Table 5. LN_TA, CHG_SALES, FOREIGN, RD_TA, and CFO_TAX are negatively 
associated with BOOK_ETR, while ROA, LEV, BIG4, and BTM are positively 
associated with BOOK_ETR. Overall, results from the gender analysis suggest that an 
IHTE’s gender is not associated with BOOK_ETR. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is not 
rejected. 
Testing the moderating effect of audit committee expertise. Due to the limited 
number of observations within each of the audit committee expertise categories and 
because of high multicollinearity between the terms associated with the product 
interaction term, the moderating effect of audit committee expertise will again be tested 
using a subsample approach in accordance with Aiken and West (1991). As with 
Hypotheses 2 through 5, the moderating hypotheses (H6B) will be tested separately on 
each background characteristic of interest. The results for moderation testing for the ITF 
sample are presented in Panel A. Moderation results for the full sample are provided in 
Panel B. Each panel presents results of moderation testing under six different conditions: 
(1) AC_TAX = 0, (2) AC_TAX = 1, (3) AC_LEGAL = 0, (4) AC_LEGAL = 1, (5) 
AC_ACCTG = 0, and (6) AC_ACCTG = 1.  
Certification and audit committee expertise. Table 14, Panel A presents all 
moderation results for certification variables across the ITF sample. Table 14, Panel B 
presents all moderation results for certification variables across the full sample. Details of 
sample size, adjusted R
2
, coefficients, and significance for each of six tests are presented 
in the table. The results for certification under each of these conditions vary somewhat 







Table 14. Regression of BOOK_ETR on certification for audit committee expertise categories 
PANEL A - Certification and Audit Committee Expertise Moderation for ITF Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {CERT_ATTY + CPA + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + 
SGA + CHG_SALES + BIG4 + PCT_TAX_NAS + ACQ + RD_TA + BTM + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
  

















Intercept +/- 0.364 *** 9.877 0.564 *** 5.152 0.442 *** 11.303 0.305 *** 4.696 0.255 *** 5.127 0.454 *** 10.829 








1.440 0.002 * 1.788 0.000 
 
0.427 
LN_TA +/- -0.010 *** -3.734 -0.013 * -1.806 -0.020 *** -6.596 -0.005 
 
-1.076 -0.009 *** -2.740 -0.022 *** -5.606 











CHG_SALES + -0.047 *** -2.637 -0.099 *** -2.682 -0.064 *** -3.205 -0.046 * -1.568 -0.025 
 
-1.009 -0.070 *** -3.200 








0.153 0.084 *** 2.645 











CAPEX_PPE + 0.113 ** 1.840 0.080 
 




1.280 0.140 ** 1.826 




-0.771 -0.028 * -1.638 










1.214 -0.019 * -1.880 
BIG4 - 0.031 ** 1.983 0.009 
 
0.236 0.037 *** 2.251 0.023 
 
0.621 0.050 *** 2.583 0.025 
 
1.082 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.002 
 
-0.071 -0.143 * -1.554 0.026 
 
0.674 -0.190 *** -2.974 -0.129 *** -2.742 0.040 * 0.926 













BTM - 0.047 *** 2.712 -0.027 
 
-0.658 0.054 *** 2.813 0.042 * 1.385 0.075 *** 3.301 0.028 
 
1.235 








-1.257 -0.425 *** -2.589 
OTH_EXEC_TAX +/- -0.002 
 
































0.187 0.039 * 1.849 
CPA +/- 0.008 
 










































































































*,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
            Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
        
 
                  






Table 14. Regression of BOOK_ETR on certification for audit committee expertise categories (continued) 
PANEL B - Certification and Audit Committee Expertise Moderation for Full Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {CERT_ATTY + CPA + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + ITF + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + 
NOL + SGA + CHG_SALES + BIG4 + PCT_TAX_NAS + ACQ + RD_TA + BTM + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
  
















Intercept +/- 0.419 *** 17.394 0.387 *** 4.653 0.447 *** 16.093 0.354 *** 7.290 0.365 *** 10.921 0.474 *** 15.026 
ROA +/- 0.001 * 1.700 0.002 
 
0.997 0.001 * 1.737 0.002 
 
1.558 0.003 *** 3.174 0.000 
 
0.444 
LN_TA +/- -0.011 *** -4.538 -0.015 ** -2.270 -0.019 *** -7.164 -0.006 
 
-1.277 -0.012 *** -3.801 -0.022 *** -6.809 
PPE_TA - -0.015 * -1.290 -0.028 
 




-0.212 -0.019 * -1.323 
CHG_SALES + -0.051 *** -3.705 -0.111 *** -3.126 -0.068 *** -4.134 -0.049 *** -2.231 -0.031 * -1.540 -0.076 *** -4.422 








1.131 0.052 ** 2.028 
SGA + -0.048 ** -1.747 -0.034 
 
-0.448 -0.050 *** -1.502 -0.063 * -1.345 -0.033 
 
-0.879 -0.053 * -1.402 
CAPEX_PPE + 0.099 *** 2.205 -0.026 
 




1.295 0.109 * 1.934 
FOREIGN +/- -0.019 ** -2.223 -0.024 
 




-1.079 -0.020 * -1.776 
NOL +/- -0.006 
 
-1.040 0.033 * 1.937 -0.007 
 
-1.059 0.018 * 1.754 0.014 * 1.619 -0.013 * -1.665 
BIG4 - 0.026 *** 2.734 0.029 
 
0.921 0.031 *** 2.879 0.034 ** 1.733 0.048 *** 3.876 0.024 * 1.739 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.041 * -1.529 -0.283 *** -4.052 -0.047 * -1.561 -0.200 *** -3.860 -0.219 *** -5.775 0.006 
 
0.165 













BTM - 0.034 *** 2.510 0.014 
 
0.392 0.041 *** 2.664 0.031 * 1.308 0.070 *** 3.760 0.017 
 
1.010 
RD_TA - -0.307 *** -3.181 -0.080 
 
-0.311 -0.308 *** -2.778 -0.237 * -1.297 -0.276 ** -2.119 -0.416 *** -3.213 
OTH_EXEC_TAX +/- 0.001 
 









CFO_TAX +/- -0.022 * 0.823 0.006 
 







ITF +/- -0.023 *** 0.085 0.048 * 1.738 0.008 
 
0.753 -0.043 *** -2.724 -0.032 *** -2.522 0.002 
 
0.149 










-0.229 0.036 * 1.857 
CPA +/- 0.009 
 















































































  F-statistic 
 
6.328 *** 5.585 *** 6.435 *** 
 
3.573 *** 5.083 *** 
 
5.270 *** 














*,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
            
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
        
See Table 2 for variable definitions.                 
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Testing for the entire and ITF only samples indicated a positive and significant 
association between CERT_ATTY and ETR. In testing the influence of audit committee 
expertise, this relationship held only when an accounting expert was present on the audit 
committee (AC_ACCTG = 1).
37
 Otherwise, CERT_ATTY was not significantly related 
to BOOK_ETR.  
Prior tests on both the ITF only sample and full sample indicated no statistically 
significant relationship between CPA and BOOK_ETR. However, this relationship is 
negative and significant in the presence of a tax expert on the audit committee (AC_TAX 
= 1),
38
 and not significant otherwise. There is some evidence to support Hypothesis 6B as 
the relationship between certification and tax avoidance is moderated by the presence of a 
tax or accounting expert on the audit committee, although not by the presence of a legal 
expert. 
Education and audit committee expertise. Table 15, Panel A presents all 
moderation results for education variables across the ITF sample. Table 15 Panel B 
presents all moderation results for education variables across the full sample. Details of 
sample size, adjusted R
2
, coefficients, and significance for each of six tests are presented 
in the table. The results for education under each of these conditions vary somewhat from 
the impact of education on the entire sample. Tests on both the ITF only and full samples 
did not provide evidence of a significant relationship between education and tax 
avoidance. However, some significant relationships were identified when testing the 
influence of audit committee expertise.
                                                 
37
 This result was consistent across the ITF (p = 0.065) and full (p = 0.064) samples. 
38





Table 15. Regression of BOOK_ETR on education for audit committee expertise categories 
PANEL A - Education and Audit Committee Expertise Moderation for ITF Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {MACC + MTX + MBA + LAW + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN 
+ NOL + SGA + CHG_SALES + BIG4 + PCT_TAX_NAS + ACQ + RD_TA + BTM + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
  
















Intercept +/- 0.390 *** 11.790 0.403 *** 3.913 0.432 *** 11.554 0.328 *** 5.105 0.301 *** 6.363 0.456 *** 9.289 













LN_TA +/- -0.008 *** -2.812 -0.011 
 
-1.263 -0.019 *** -6.003 0.002 
 
0.372 -0.007 ** -1.954 -0.019 *** -4.757 















-0.952 -0.055 *** -2.682 








0.869 0.075 *** 2.483 
SGA + -0.031 
 
-0.904 0.261 *** 2.272 -0.012 
 







































1.563 -0.020 * -1.905 




0.484 0.036 *** 2.231 -0.045 * -1.376 0.049 *** 2.498 0.006 
 
0.243 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.011 
 
-0.324 -0.179 ** -2.106 0.027 
 
0.692 -0.186 *** -2.955 -0.136 *** -2.831 0.055 
 
1.247 













BTM - 0.038 *** 2.219 0.020 
 
0.533 0.047 *** 2.514 0.020 
 
0.706 0.052 *** 2.397 0.025 
 
1.149 
RD_TA - -0.291 *** -2.473 -0.349 
 




-0.891 -0.385 *** -2.566 
















































MBA +/- -0.009 
 
-0.842 0.051 ** 2.222 0.013 
 



















































































































*,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
            
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
        
See Table 2 for variable definitions.                 










Table 15. Regression of BOOK_ETR on education for audit committee expertise categories (continued) 
PANEL B - Education and Audit Committee Expertise Moderation for Full Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {MACC + MTX + MBA + LAW + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + ITF + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + 
FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + CHG_SALES + BIG4 + PCT_TAX_NAS + ACQ + RD_TA + BTM + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
  
















Intercept +/- 0.406 *** 16.846 0.332 *** 3.638 0.439 *** 15.996 0.355 *** 0.000 0.372 *** 11.284 0.469 *** 14.843 








0.598 0.002 ** 2.350 0.000 
 
0.350 
LN_TA +/- -0.008 *** -3.356 -0.016 ** -2.152 -0.018 *** -6.302 0.001 
 
0.866 -0.010 *** -2.979 -0.020 *** -5.761 











CHG_SALES + -0.043 *** -3.194 -0.092 *** -2.701 -0.056 *** -3.562 -0.038 ** 0.086 -0.030 * -1.501 -0.063 *** -3.830 
LEV +/- 0.033 * 1.720 0.108 
 
1.515 0.069 *** 2.961 -0.003 
 
0.929 0.049 * 1.745 0.045 * 1.830 











CAPEX_PPE + 0.064 * 1.446 -0.096 
 




0.659 0.076 * 1.335 
FOREIGN +/- -0.018 ** -2.187 -0.012 
 













-1.354 0.023 ** 0.020 0.015 * 1.828 -0.015 * -1.890 
BIG4 - 0.019 ** 2.013 0.047 * 1.319 0.029 *** 2.691 -0.002 
 
0.899 0.042 *** 3.332 0.014 
 
0.983 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.048 ** -1.741 -0.278 *** -4.106 -0.046 * -1.508 -0.200 *** 0.000 -0.218 *** -5.646 0.018 
 
0.514 













BTM - 0.027 ** 2.012 0.037 
 
1.083 0.034 *** 2.274 0.013 
 
0.562 0.046 *** 2.548 0.018 *** 1.063 
RD_TA - -0.286 *** -3.068 -0.161 
 
-0.617 -0.294 *** -2.789 -0.254 * 0.158 -0.224 ** -1.734 -0.355 
 
-2.951 
OTH_EXEC_TAX +/- -0.004 
 









CFO_TAX +/- -0.027 ** -2.175 -0.014 
 




-0.679 -0.022 * -1.654 



















-0.171 0.021 * 1.646 




































































































































*,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
            
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
        
See Table 2 for variable definitions.                 




When testing on the ITF sample, both MACC and MBA are negatively and 
significantly related to BOOK_ETR (p = 0.027 and 0.022, respectively) when a legal 
expert is present on the audit committee (AC_LEGAL = 1). By contrast, MBA is 
positively and significantly related to BOOK_ETR (p = 0.029) when a tax expert is 
present on the audit committee (AC_TAX = 1).
39
 No other combinations of education and 
audit committee expertise yielded statistically significant coefficients. Specifically, 
accounting expertise within the audit committee (AC_ACCTG = 1) did not appear to 
influence the relationship between education and BOOK_ETR.  
When testing on the full sample, MBA is again negatively and significantly 
related to BOOK_ETR (p = 0.064) when AC_LEGAL = 1. MACC is not significant 
under this condition. The coefficient for MBA is positive but not statistically significant 
for the full sample when AC_TAX = 1. Additionally, the coefficient for LAW is negative 
and significant (p = 0.048) when an accounting expert is not present on the audit 
committee (AC_ACCTG = 0), but LAW is not significant under other expertise 
conditions. The coefficient for MACC is positive and significant (p = 0.10) when 
AC_ACCTG = 1 but is not significant under other audit committee expertise conditions. 
The mix of results documented above is evidence of the complex relationship 
across an IHTE’s education, audit committee expertise, and a firm’s tax avoidance 
choices. Different combinations of educational background and audit committee expertise 
can yield significantly different influences on a firm’s BOOK_ETR. These varying 
results support Hypothesis 6B as it relates to education. The relationship between an 
                                                 
39
 There were some VIFs higher than 10.0 in the ITF analysis for AC_Tax = 1, primarily due to 





IHTE’s educational background and a firm’s tax avoidance behavior is moderated by the 
presence of a tax, legal, or accounting expert on the audit committee.  
Experience and audit committee expertise. Table 16, Panel A presents all 
moderation results for experience across the ITF sample. Table 16, Panel B presents all 
moderation results for experience across the full sample. Details of sample size, adjusted 
R
2
, coefficients, and significance for each of six tests are presented in the table. The 
results for experience under each of these conditions vary somewhat from the impact of 
experience on the entire sample. Tests on the ITF only and full samples did not provide 
evidence of a significant relationship between experience and tax avoidance. However, a 
more complex relationship was identified through testing for the moderating influence of 
audit committee expertise. 
When testing the ITF sample, experience (LN_EXPERIENCE) is an insignificant 
factor under most conditions. However, in the presence of a legal expert on the audit 
committee (AC_LEGAL) = 1, an IHTE’s experience is positively and significantly 
related to BOOK_ETR (p = 0.078). Thus, an IHTE tends to become more conservative 
with increased experience, but only when overseen by an audit committee member with 
legal expertise. By contrast, the presence of tax expertise (AC_TAX = 1)
40
 and 
accounting expertise (AC_ACCTG = 1) do not appear to influence the relationship 
between LN_EXPERIENCE and BOOK_ETR.  
 With an increase in sample size associated with testing the full sample, other 
relationships were found to be significant. LN_EXPERIENCE is again positively and 
significantly related to BOOK_ETR (p = 0.065) when AC_LEGAL = 1. However,   
                                                 
40
 This particular equation yielded VIFs greater than 10.0 for some variables, likely due to a small 







Table 16. Regression of BOOK_ETR on experience for audit committee expertise categories 
PANEL A - Experience and Audit Committee Expertise Moderation for ITF Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {LN_EXPERIENCE + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN 
+ NOL + SGA + CHG_SALES + BIG4 + PCT_TAX_NAS + ACQ + RD_TA + BTM + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
    
  
AC_TAX = 0 AC_TAX = 1 AC_LEGAL = 0 AC_LEGAL = 1 AC_ACCTG = 0 AC_ACCTG = 1 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate   t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.435 *** 8.716 0.047 
 
0.239 0.589 *** 9.838 0.291 *** 2.810 0.239 *** 3.195 0.656 *** 9.875 






-0.702 0.002 ** 0.927 0.003 
 
2.059 -0.003 ** -2.049 
LN_TA +/- -0.009 *** -2.466 -0.010 
 




-0.879 -0.023 *** -5.019 
PPE_TA - -0.028 * -1.412 0.023 
 







CHG_SALES + -0.058 *** -2.938 -0.053 
 
-1.165 -0.058 *** -2.716 -0.016 ** -0.453 -0.047 
 
-1.708 -0.060 *** -2.509 
LEV +/- 0.075 *** 2.705 0.208 
 
1.365 0.096 *** 2.970 0.122 * 1.995 0.082 * 1.877 0.125 *** 3.721 

















0.916 0.155 ** 1.810 
FOREIGN +/- -0.037 *** -2.572 -0.028 
 
-0.572 -0.037 ** -2.285 -0.025 
 
-0.868 -0.031 * -1.645 -0.011 
 
-0.596 
NOL +/- -0.009 
 

















-1.113 0.039 ** 1.816 -0.022 
 
-0.864 
PCT_TAXNAS - 0.008 
 
0.188 -0.275 ** -2.133 -0.003 
 
-0.064 -0.132 ** -1.654 -0.087 * -1.546 0.087 * 1.610 










-1.106 0.021 ** 1.961 
BTM - 0.057 *** 2.893 0.086 * 1.431 0.060 *** 2.855 0.045 
 
1.144 0.072 *** 2.821 0.035 * 1.426 






-0.668 -0.328 ** -1.836 
















































AC_ACCTG +/- -0.007 
 


















































































*,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
            
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
        
See Table 2 for variable definitions.                 









Table 16. Regression of BOOK_ETR on experience for audit committee expertise categories (continued) 
PANEL B - Experience and Audit Committee Expertise Moderation for Full Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {LN_EXPERIENCE + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + ITF + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + 
NOL + SGA + CHG_SALES + BIG4 + PCT_TAX_NAS + ACQ + RD_TA + BTM + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
  
















Intercept +/- 0.414 *** 15.478 0.380 *** 2.572 0.445 *** 15.154 0.381 *** 6.334 0.366 *** 9.865 0.502 *** 14.983 








0.804 0.003 *** 3.197 -0.002 * -1.647 
LN_TA +/- -0.009 *** -2.953 -0.015 
 
-1.620 -0.015 *** -4.830 -0.006 
 
-1.000 -0.009 ** -2.265 -0.022 *** -5.797 







CHG_SALES + -0.060 *** -4.041 -0.075 ** -1.767 -0.069 *** -3.985 -0.043 ** -1.712 -0.048 *** -2.231 -0.072 *** -3.989 
LEV +/- 0.055 *** 2.572 0.241 ** 2.492 0.077 *** 3.016 0.034 
 
0.788 0.096 *** 2.944 0.058 ** 2.176 











CAPEX_PPE + 0.097 ** 1.968 0.156 
 




1.110 0.134 ** 2.188 
FOREIGN +/- -0.022 ** -2.423 -0.037 
 
-1.294 -0.025 ** -2.373 -0.015 
 
-0.877 -0.025 ** -1.985 -0.017 
 
-1.430 








1.205 0.019 ** 2.025 -0.014 * -1.689 
BIG4 - 0.019 * 1.895 0.036 
 
0.680 0.022 ** 1.915 0.021 
 
0.959 0.048 *** 3.557 0.007 
 
0.518 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.048 * -1.556 -0.316 *** -3.614 -0.073 ** -2.157 -0.175 *** -2.815 -0.216 *** -5.023 0.030 
 
0.762 










-0.326 0.014 * 1.665 
BTM - 0.038 *** 2.582 0.057 * 1.289 0.044 *** 2.685 0.018 
 
0.649 0.065 *** 3.164 0.016 
 
0.868 
RD_TA - -0.264 *** -2.539 1.056 *** 2.337 -0.196 ** -1.640 -0.227 
 
-1.057 -0.197 * -1.399 -0.331 *** -2.443 




























0.251 0.097 *** 2.659 -0.129 *** -2.516 -0.038 
 
-0.829 0.092 *** 2.470 




-0.194 -0.032 *** -2.669 0.030 * 1.855 0.002 
 
0.111 -0.030 ** -2.431 
AC_TAX +/- 
      





























































































*,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
           
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
       
See Table 2 for variable definitions.                 
         




without a legal expert on the audit committee (AC_LEGAL = 0), the coefficient for 
LN_EXPERIENCE is negative and significant (p = 0.008). Thus, legal expertise serves to 
dampen what may otherwise be a tendency toward increased aggressiveness. By contrast, 
the coefficient for LN_EXPERIENCE is negative and significant (p = 0.015) when an 
accounting expert is present on the audit committee (AC_ACCTG = 1). The presence of 
audit committee tax expertise (AC_TAX = 1) or the absence of audit committee expertise 
(AC_TAX, AC_ACCTG, or AC_LEGAL = 0) does not appear to influence the 
relationship between an IHTE’s experience and tax avoidance.
41
 
These results suggest a complex relationship across an IHTE’s level of 
experience, audit committee expertise, and their combined influence on a firm’s tax 
avoidance choices. Hypothesis 6B for experience is supported by these results. The 
relationship between an IHTE’s experience level and a firm’s tax avoidance behavior is 
moderated by the presence of a legal or accounting expert on the audit committee, 
although not by the presence of a tax expert.  
Gender and audit committee expertise. Table 17, Panel A presents all moderation 
results for gender (MALE) across the ITF sample. Table 17, Panel B presents all 
moderation results for gender across the full sample. Details of sample size, adjusted R
2
, 
coefficients, and significance for each of six tests are presented in the table. The 
regression results for gender under each of these conditions are consistent with the results 
obtained when testing on the entire population. The coefficient for MALE was not 
statistically significant under any of the audit committee expertise conditions. These 
findings were consistent when testing the ITF and full samples. Given these findings,   
                                                 
41
 All six regression equations generated VIFs higher than 10.0 when the influence of experience 
was tested on the full sample. Again, these results can likely be attributed to the high correlation between 







Table 17. Regression of BOOK_ETR on gender for audit committee expertise categories 
Panel A - Gender and Audit Committee Expertise Moderation for ITF Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {MALE + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + 
CHG_SALES + BIG4 + PCT_TAX_NAS + ACQ + RD_TA + BTM + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
  














Intercept +/- 0.361 *** 13.567 0.367 *** 3.274 0.353 *** 11.619 0.395 *** 6.835 0.325 *** 8.541 0.415 *** 10.143 
ROA +/- 0.002 ** 2.403 0.005 *** 2.658 0.003 *** 3.174 0.001 
 
0.652 0.003 *** 2.871 0.002 * 1.729 
LN_TA +/- -0.009 *** -4.331 -0.028 *** -3.448 -0.013 *** -5.518 -0.009 ** -2.258 -0.011 *** -3.973 -0.015 *** -5.005 













CHG_SALES + -0.022 * -1.601 -0.091 *** -2.290 -0.031 ** -1.937 -0.061 *** -2.467 -0.021 
 
-1.043 -0.038 ** -2.107 
LEV +/- 0.039 ** 2.022 0.034 
 




1.184 0.063 ** 2.431 






















FOREIGN +/- -0.025 *** -2.630 -0.023 
 




-1.489 -0.022 * -1.656 




1.645 -0.013 ** -1.979 0.013 
 
1.315 0.007 *** 0.955 -0.017 ** -2.237 
BIG4 - 0.030 ** 2.189 0.068 
 
1.538 0.036 *** 2.528 -0.003 
 
-0.088 0.044 ** 2.530 0.018 
 
0.919 



















0.926 0.003 *** 0.479 0.006 
 
0.859 
BTM - 0.049 *** 3.707 0.062 
 
1.327 0.065 *** 4.205 0.027 
 
1.107 0.066 *** 3.739 0.044 *** 2.411 
RD_TA - -0.338 *** -3.576 -0.265 
 
-0.857 -0.265 *** -2.522 -0.564 *** -2.733 -0.462 
 
-3.644 -0.271 ** -2.110 













CFO_TAX +/- -0.023 ** -2.017 0.013 
 




-0.344 -0.027 ** -2.214 





















0.596 -0.017 * -1.856 









      AC_LEGAL +/- 0.010 * 1.631 -0.009 
 
-0.528 








































































*,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
           
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
       
See Table 2 for variable definitions.                 








Table 17. Regression of BOOK_ETR on gender for audit committee expertise categories (continued) 
PANEL B - Gender and Audit Committee Expertise Moderation for Full Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {MALE + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + ITF + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + 
CHG_SALES + BIG4 + PCT_TAX_NAS + ACQ + RD_TA + BTM + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
  
















Intercept +/- 0.397 *** 19.504 0.343 *** 4.009 0.395 *** 16.451 0.364 *** 8.650 0.381 *** 13.194 0.423 *** 15.285 
ROA +/- 0.001 *** 2.483 0.005 *** 3.361 0.002 *** 3.341 0.001 
 
0.963 0.003 *** 3.648 0.001 * 1.641 
LN_TA +/- -0.009 *** -4.897 -0.026 *** -3.654 -0.014 *** -6.178 -0.010 *** -2.706 -0.013 *** -4.959 -0.016 *** -5.974 













CHG_SALES + -0.031 *** -2.639 -0.108 *** -2.940 -0.041 *** -2.921 -0.060 *** -2.982 -0.025 * -1.482 -0.049 *** -3.262 
LEV +/- 0.034 ** 2.036 0.027 
 
0.338 0.071 *** 3.471 -0.016 
 
-0.518 0.048 * 1.918 0.044 ** 1.983 








-0.446 -0.042 * -1.318 
CAPEX_PPE + 0.063 ** 1.651 -0.080 
 







FOREIGN +/- -0.016 ** -2.247 -0.022 
 
-1.062 -0.017 ** -2.012 -0.013 
 
-0.945 -0.019 ** -2.090 -0.016 * -1.690 
NOL +/- -0.006 
 
-1.185 0.039 *** 2.502 -0.010 * -1.833 0.017 ** 2.038 0.010 
 
1.542 -0.014 ** -2.204 
BIG4 - 0.025 *** 2.874 0.073 ** 2.125 0.029 *** 2.883 0.028 * 1.505 0.046 *** 3.874 0.020 * 1.580 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.023 
 
-1.015 -0.211 *** -2.987 -0.037 * -1.476 -0.108 *** -2.322 -0.153 *** -4.588 -0.002 
 
-0.070 
ACQ +/- 0.003 
 









BTM - 0.039 *** 3.484 0.059 
 
1.487 0.052 *** 3.919 0.024 
 
1.199 0.061 *** 3.945 0.033 ** 2.186 
RD_TA - -0.340 *** -4.253 -0.239 
 
-0.919 -0.292 *** -3.159 -0.472 *** -2.930 -0.434 *** -3.990 -0.297 *** -2.747 
























ITF +/- -0.022 *** -2.647 0.031 
 
1.187 -0.009 *** -0.938 -0.022 
 
-1.370 -0.026 ** -2.394 0.009 
 
0.799 
























AC_ACCTG +/- -0.003 
 





      AC_LEGAL +/- 0.011 ** 2.142 -0.007 
 
-0.493 








































































*,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
            
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
        
See Table 2 for variable definitions.                 






Hypothesis 6B as it relates to gender cannot be supported. The relationship between an 
IHTE’s gender and a firm’s tax avoidance behavior is not moderated by the presence of a 
tax, legal, or accounting expert on the audit committee. 
Supplemental analysis. While certification is the only hypothesized 
characteristic found to be statistically significant in the primary regression model, I 
explore a number of other characteristics through supplemental analysis. These additional 
tests reveal some interesting relationships between ETR and other background 
characteristics of IHTEs. Specifically, I gather and test details on IHTE international tax 
experience, IHTEs who have prior work experience with their firm’s auditor, and IHTE 
tenure within the firm. I incorporate these variables into the main regression equation 
outlined above. First, I test each variable separately. Then, I incorporate all three 
variables together. These results are discussed in detail below and are presented in Table 
18. Panel A presents results on the ITF sample, while Panel B presents results on the full 
sample. I also test age as another explanatory variable; details are presented in Table 19. 
International tax experience. The relationship between foreign operations and 
tax avoidance is well-documented in the literature (e.g., Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009; Markle 
& Shackelford, 2010; Rego, 2003). Within this study, I find that an ITF is significantly 
and negatively related to tax avoidance in firms with foreign operations. How, though, 
might an IHTE’s exposure to and experience with complex international tax issues 
influence his or her tax avoidance decisions in a general context? I test the impact of an 
IHTE’s international tax experience (INTL_TAX) by incorporating a dummy variable 







Table 18. Regression of BOOK_ETR on international tax, auditor alumni, and tenure 
PANEL A - Supplemental Tests for ITF = 1 Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {IHTE_CHARACTERISTICS^ + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + 
LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + CHG_SALES + BIG4 + PCT_TAX_NAS + ACQ + RD_TA + BTM 
+ INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
              








Alumni + Tenure 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
 
Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.390 *** 10.802 
 
0.412 *** 12.584 
 
0.359 *** 12.439 
 
0.398 *** 8.540 






0.002 *** 2.626 
 
0.002 ** 2.080 
LN_TA +/- -0.011 *** -3.996 
 
-0.013 *** -5.014 
 
-0.008 *** -3.356 
 
-0.013 *** -3.857 













CHG_SALES + -0.037 ** -1.874 
 
-0.039 *** -2.252 
 
-0.041 *** -2.688 
 
-0.039 ** -1.756 




0.050 ** 2.001 
 















0.057 * 1.271 




0.095 * 1.524 
 

















-0.015 * -1.719 
FOREIGN +/- -0.050 *** -3.289 
 
-0.028 ** -2.124 
 
-0.031 *** -2.916 
 
-0.047 *** 3.121 
BIG4 - 0.032 ** 2.008 
 
0.021 * 1.278 
 
0.019 * 1.378 
 
0.058 *** -1.780 










-0.081 ** 1.008 















BTM - 0.059 *** 3.296 
 
0.060 *** 3.571 
 
0.055 *** 3.614 
 
0.074 *** -1.616 
RD_TA - -0.297 *** -2.355 
 
-0.309 *** -2.584 
 
-0.361 *** -3.341 
 
-0.224 ** 0.437 












-0.019 * -1.685 













INTL_TAX +/- -0.030 *** -3.817 
         
-0.024 *** -2.512 
AUD_ALUM +/- 
    
-0.026 *** -3.113
     
-0.057 *** -4.970 
LN_TENURE +/- 





-0.013 ** -2.027 














































   
YES 
   
YES 
   
YES 
  Industry Dummy 
 
YES 
   
YES 
   
YES 
   
YES 
  Observations 
 
527 
   
615 
   
850 
   
390 









 Adjusted R2 
 
0.293 
   
0.320 
   
0.252 
   
0.352 
               ^ In supplemental tests, I analyze (1) international tax experience, (2) auditor alumni effect, and (3) firm tenure separately.  In addition, I analyze these variables in one regression 
equation at the same time. 
*,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
       Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 








Table 18. Regression of BOOK_ETR on international tax, auditor alumni, and tenure (continued) 
PANEL B - Supplemental Tests for Full Sample 
BOOK_ETR = f {IHTE_CHARACTERISTICS^ + ITF + AC_TAX + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + LN_TA + LEV + ROA + PPE_TA + 
CAPEX_PPE + FOREIGN + NOL + SGA + CHG_SALES + BIG4 + PCT_TAX_NAS + ACQ + RD_TA + BTM + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 
              








Alumni + Tenure 
Variable Expected Sign Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic  Estimate t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.404 *** 16.718 
 
0.430 *** 18.492 
 
0.397 *** 18.268 
 
0.409 *** 15.872 
ROA +/- 0.001 ** 2.231 
 
0.001 ** 2.198 
 
0.002 *** 2.782 
 
0.002 ** 2.381 
LN_TA +/- -0.013 *** -5.274 
 
-0.014 *** -6.123 
 
-0.010 *** -4.577 
 
-0.014 *** -4.790 













CHG_SALES + -0.051 *** -3.531 
 
-0.047 *** -3.493 
 
-0.049 *** -3.875 
 
-0.049 *** -3.227 




0.037 * 1.823 
 


















CAPEX_PPE + 0.070 * 1.562 
 
0.072 ** 1.663 
 




















FOREIGN +/- -0.025 *** -2.855 
 
-0.017 ** -2.115 
 
-0.021 *** -2.728 
 
-0.022 ** -2.377 
BIG4 - 0.034 *** 3.609 
 
0.028 *** 2.983 
 
0.023 *** 2.584 
 
0.042 *** 4.200 
PCT_TAXNAS - -0.139 *** -4.839 
 
-0.065 *** -2.441 
 
-0.077 *** -3.087 
 
-0.130 *** -4.150 















BTM - 0.039 *** 2.875 
 
0.041 *** 3.167 
 
0.040 *** 3.214 
 
0.044 *** 2.873 
RD_TA - -0.309 *** -3.262 
 
-0.330 *** -3.567 
 
-0.339 *** -3.898 
 
-0.270 *** -2.729 























-0.021 ** -2.072 
 
-0.027 ** -2.054 












0.036 *** 2.699 
INTL_TAX +/- -0.030 *** -4.141 
         
-0.022 *** -2.589 
AUD_ALUM +/- 
    
-0.025 *** -3.188
     
-0.047 *** -4.502 
LN_TENURE +/- 
        
-0.007 * -1.846
 











































   
YES 
   
YES 
   
YES 
  Industry Dummy 
 
YES 
   
YES 
   
YES 
   
YES 
  Observations 
 
768 
   
856 
   
1091 
   
631 









 Adjusted R2 
 
0.333 
   
0.335 
   
0.281 
   
0.359 
    
               ^ In supplemental tests, I analyze (1) international tax experience, (2) auditor alumni effect, and (3) firm tenure separately.  In addition, I analyze these variables in 
one regression equation at once. 
 *,**, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
       Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
  See Table 2 for variable definitions. 





INTL_TAX is negatively and statistically significantly related to BOOK_ETR in 
tests on both the ITF and full sample (p = 0.000 and 0.000, respectively). I also test this 
relationship separately on firms with foreign operations and those without foreign 
operations, details of which have not been tabulated. When testing on the full sample, I 
find that this negative relationship holds for firms that have foreign operations as well as 
those that do not have foreign operations. However, when I analyze the ITF population, 
the negative coefficient for INTL_TAX is significant only for the subsample of 
companies with foreign operations. 
Auditor alumni effect. Concerns over auditor independence have resulted in 
policies that regulate “revolving door” practices, limiting a firm’s ability to recruit former 
audit firm employees to fill executive and board positions and establishing a cooling-off 
period before such relationships can be established. However, some current research 
indicates that the recruitment of auditor alumni can provide some financial reporting 
benefits (Naiker & Sharma, 2009; Naiker, Sharma, & Sharma, 2012). To date, no 
research has considered how this auditor alumni effect may influence tax-related 
outcomes. Approximately 23% of IHTEs in the sample were previously employed by 
their company’s audit firm. Because IHTEs work closely with both auditors and tax 
consultants within the audit firm, it is important to understand how an alumni effect may 
influence the working relationship between audit firm and client and, ultimately, that 
client’s tax avoidance decisions. To pursue this question, I create a dummy variable 
(AUD_ALUM) equal to 1 if an IHTE was previously employed by the audit firm, 0 
otherwise. I find that AUD_ALUM is negatively and statistically significantly related to 





Tenure. In addition to exploring how an IHTE’s overall experience level 
influences tax avoidance, I look at the influence of firm-specific tenure 
(LN_TENURE),
42
 a characteristic that has been explored in prior managerial research 
(e.g., H. Chen et al., 2010; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Herrmann & Datta, 2002). 
Hermann and Datta (2002) argue that CEOs with less tenure are less familiar with their 
companies, have less established power, and are therefore likely to be more conservative 
in their decision making. On the other hand, CEOs with greater tenure “become more 
familiar with the decision process and acquire greater task knowledge, expertise, and 
experience along with increased power within the organization” (p. 556). As a result, 
CEOs with greater tenure are likely to take more risks in their decision-making.  
Similarly, with increased tenure an IHTE gains increased knowledge, expertise, 
and power. As an IHTE acquires more firm-specific knowledge with regard to tax 
matters, this increased knowledge may lead to more effective and/or aggressive tax 
planning and, in turn, lower BOOK_ETR. Consistent with this expectation, when I 
include LN_TENURE in the main regression model, I find that the coefficient on this 
variable is negative and statistically significant (p = 0.065) for the full sample. The 
coefficient is negative but not significant (p = 0.132) for the smaller ITF sample.  
International tax, auditor alumni effect, and tenure. When I consider all 
three of these variables in the ETR regression for ITF companies, I find that all three 
variables are significantly related to BOOK_ETR. The coefficients for INTL_TAX, 
AUD_ALUM, and LN_TENURE are each negative and statistically significant (p = 
0.012, 0.000, and 0.043, respectively). When I expand this analysis to the full sample, I 
                                                 
42






obtain similar results. The coefficients for INTL_TAX, AUD_ALUM, and LN_TENURE 
are again negative and statistically significant (p = 0.010, 0.000, and 0.077 respectively). 
Thus, these characteristics are of importance in explaining tax avoidance and should be 
considered, when possible, in future research. 
Composite profile for an IHTE. While each IHTE hypothesis has been tested 
separately due to sample size concerns, I consider how a combination of these 
characteristics may influence tax avoidance. Specifically, I seek to model a composite 
IHTE profile and test how this composite variable is associated with tax avoidance.
43
 I 
develop and test three different approaches to building this composite profile. Results of 
these analyses have not been tabulated, but are discussed in detail below. 
First, I create a continuous variable, COMPOSITE_IHTEINDEX, which 
represents a composite index for an IHTE. To calculate this index, I consider each of the 
background variables tested in primary analysis, which includes two certification 
variables (CPA and CERT_ATTY), four education variables, (MACC, MTX, MBA, and 
LAW), experience, and gender (MALE). For experience, I create a binary variable 
(MORE_EXPERIENCE) and use the median value of LN_EXPERIENCE as a cut off 
value for this variable. The test variable COMPOSITE _IHTEINDEX is calculated as the 
sum of the value for each of the IHTE variables (CPA + CERT_ATTY + MACC + MTX 
+ MBA + LAW + MORE_EXPERIENCE + MALE). The minimum theoretical value is 0 
and maximum is 8, if an IHTE meets each and all of these criteria. Then, I regress 
BOOK_ETR on COMPOSITE_IHTEINDEX for both the ITF only and full samples, 
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 This analysis does not tell us which combination of characteristics is most significantly related 
to tax avoidance.  Such information, however, would prove useful to executives as it would provide a guide 
as to what attributes to look for in an IHTE.  Such an analysis is outside the scope of this dissertation, but 





using the regression model detailed in Table 18. In both tests, I do not find a significant 
association between COMPOSITE_IHTEINDEX and BOOK_ETR. 
Next, I again consider the four characteristics for which hypotheses were 
presented. In this instance, using the results of hypothesis testing, I create an indicator 
variable to measure a combination of characteristics in an IHTE’s background that may 
be positively associated with tax avoidance. In primary analysis, graduate education, 
experience, and male gender were all negatively, though not significantly, associated with 
BOOK_ETR. In addition, attorney certification was positively and significantly 
associated with BOOK_ETR. I would therefore expect an IHTE who (1) holds a graduate 
degree, (2) has more experience than the average IHTE, (3) is male, and (4) is not a 
certified attorney to engage in higher levels of tax avoidance. I create an indicator 
variable (COMPOSITE_IHTE1) equal to 1 when all of these criteria are met (0 
otherwise) and substitute this IHTE variable in the ETR regression equation presented in 
Table 18. I find that COMPOSITE_IHTE1 is negatively and significantly associated with 
BOOK_ETR when tested using the full sample (p = 0.016). COMPOSITE_IHTE1 is 
negatively related to BOOK_ETR, but not significant, when tested on only the ITF 
sample. 
Finally, because in supplemental analysis I find that AUD_ALUMN, INTL_TAX, 
and TENURE are significantly associated with tax avoidance, I model a composite IHTE 
with these and any other statistically significant characteristics. In this instance, I look for 
an IHTE who (1) is not a certified attorney, (2) is an auditor alumni, (3) has international 
tax experience, and (4) has more tenure than the average IHTE. I create an indicator 





met, 0 otherwise. When I substitute COMPOSITE_IHTE2 as the independent variable in 
Table 18’s regression equation, I find that COMPOSITE_IHTE2 is negatively and 
significantly associated with BOOK_ETR when tested on both the ITF only and full 
samples (p = 0.000 and 0.000, respectively).   
Title of the IHTE. A tax manager, director, or vice president could not be 
identified for approximately 39 firms in the ITF sample. Since the tax department 
employee identified in these instances may not actually be responsible for tax avoidance 
decisions, I eliminate these observations in supplemental analysis. Regression results are 
not tabulated here, but are consistent with the primary analysis conducted on IHTE 
background characteristics. Thus, the elimination of these observations does not have a 
significant impact on the relationship between IHTE characteristics and tax avoidance in 
this sample.  
Undergraduate degree held by the IHTE. Education regressions conducted 
above consider whether an IHTE held one of four graduate degrees, but do not 
specifically include a variable representing an IHTE’s undergraduate degree. I was able 
to confirm that 832 of the 1,159 IHTEs held an undergraduate degree and assumed that 
the remaining 327 had also earned an undergraduate degree. However, because I also 
analyzed a combined graduate degree category consisting of MACC + MTX + MBA + 
LAW, I have essentially tested for the impact of a graduate degree in business or law 
versus the impact of only an undergraduate degree or that of a non-business graduate 
degree.  
Additional factors. Prior upper echelon research (e.g., Bamber et al., 2010; 





managerial decision-making. As noted previously, I do not have adequate data to analyze 
the full impact of age on tax avoidance. However, a simple correlation analysis (see 
Table 19) indicates that both age and experience are negatively related to BOOK_ETR. 
As age or experience increases, BOOK_ETR decreases. In addition, I find that 
experience and age are significantly and positively correlated. The Spearman correlation 
is 0.79 (p = 0.000) for the ITF sample, indicating that these two variables share almost 
64% of variance. The correlation for the full sample is also very high (0.995, p = 0.000). 
Given the close relationship between age and experience, one can reasonably extend the 
above analytical conclusions for an IHTE’s experience level to an IHTE’s age. 
Table 19. Correlations of age, experience, and BOOK_ETR 
Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonal 
      
PANEL A: ITF = 1 Sample 
     
  BOOK_ETR   LN_AGE   LN_EXPERIENCE 
BOOK_ETR 
  -.375  -.099 
LN_AGE 
-.416    .808 
LN_EXPERIENCE 
-.121  .789   
 
     
      PANEL B: Full Sample 
     
  BOOK_ETR   LN_AGE   LN_EXPERIENCE 
BOOK_ETR 
  -.361  -.205 
LN_AGE 
-.455    .999 
LN_EXPERIENCE 
-.245  .995   
      Correlations significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
     
Additional Tests 
Year by year analysis. Since in-house expertise, audit committee expertise, and 





a risk of non-independence in the test and other variables. I replicate my analysis in Table 
5 on a year-by-year basis in an attempt to address any auto-correlation and also to 
evaluate the stability of my results over time. When I estimate yearly regressions (which 
are not tabulated), the coefficient for ITF is negative for 2010, 2008, and 2007, but only 
significant for 2010.
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 This result is likely due to the small sample sizes resulting from 
yearly analysis. Sample sizes are 486, 312, 265, and 337 for 2010, 2009, 2008, and 2007, 
respectively. 
Change analysis. I also focus on how changes in ITF affect changes in tax 
avoidance as proxied by BOOK_ETR. To perform this analysis, I regress a variable 
calculated as the change in BOOK_ETR (i.e., BOOK_ETRt – BOOK_ETRt-1) on change 
variables for ITF and the control variables included in Equation (1). To be included in the 
change analysis, a firm must have data (including positive book income and an ETR 
between 0 and 100%) for both Yeart and Yeart-1. When I apply this restriction, I am left 
with 221 observations from 2010 (2010-2009), 204 observations from 2009 (2009-2008), 
and 237 observations from 2008 (2008-2007). Similarly, this change analysis did not 
indicate any significant associations, likely because the sample size dropped from 1,400 
to 672. Results of this analysis have not been tabulated. 
Potential endogeneity and selection bias. I test for endogeneity and selection 
bias using a variety of regression models. First, to test for selection bias, I create a model 
designed to predict whether a firm employs an ITF and test whether BOOK_ETR is a 
significant factor in this model. With this approach, I can confirm whether the impact of 
ITF on BOOK_ETR is a result of firms with lower ETRs being more likely to have an 
ITF. Because prior research has not analyzed determinants of an ITF, I rely on research 
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that analyzes determinants of tax planning (Mills et al., 1998) and determinants of tax 
return preparer choices (Klassen et al., 2012).  
An ITF can represent a significant resource investment for firms. For example, 
Mills et al. (1998) report that tax department salaries represent an average 28% of selling, 
general, and administrative expenses for 166 firms included in their analysis of tax 
planning expenditures. Thirty-seven percent of corporate respondents to a TEI 2004-2005 
survey indicated that their firms have tax department budgets in excess of $1 million 
(Klassen et al., 2012). In a 2011-2012 TEI survey, that percentage rose to 56%, with 22% 
indicating a tax department budget in excess of $3 million (TEI, 2012).
45
 In their early 
analysis of investments in tax planning, Mills et al. (1998) examine factors that influence 
firm spending on internal and external tax planning resources. Using a combination of 
publicly available information and survey details, Mills et al. (1998) consider a number 
of factors related to firm complexity in their model. These factors are relevant as 
complexity can create tax saving opportunities. Such factors include size, leverage, 
capital intensity, inventory intensity, foreign operations, and number of business 
segments (as provided from the survey). Mills et al. find that size is negatively related to 
investments in tax planning while the remaining factors are positively related to a firm’s 
investments in tax planning.  
In a more recent analysis, Klassen et al. (2012) examine factors that influence a 
company’s decision to internally prepare its corporate tax return versus hire an external 
preparer. Klassen et al. (2012) rely on Mills et al. (1998) for determining control 
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 The 2004-2005 TEI survey was completed by 1,319 corporate heads of tax while the 2011-2012 







 but also incorporate the influence of the current regulatory environment by 
considering uncertain tax benefits and auditor-provided NAS. The researchers also 
consider additional measures of firm complexity that include R&D, NOLs, and ROA. 
Auditor-provided NAS is negatively related to internal return preparation while all other 
variables are positively related to internal return preparation. 
For purposes of my analysis, I draw on both of these studies to develop a model 
of firms likely to have an ITF; I similarly focus on indicators of firm complexity. Given 
the magnitude of tax department costs reported by TEI (2012) and Mills et al. (1998), 
firms that have an ITF must derive some financial benefit to justify incurring such costs. 
Complex firms have greater opportunities for tax planning (e.g., Mills et al., 1998) and 
can therefore achieve greater tax benefits to offset costs associated with an ITF. 
Because Mills et al. used a survey to obtain some of their data, I am unable to 
include all variables in my analysis as some information is unavailable. In addition, I 
consider factors from my BOOK_ETR analysis that could determine the existence of an 
ITF. Per Mills et al. (1998) and Klassen et al. (2012), my model includes size (LN_TA), 
profitability (ROA based on pretax income), capital intensity (PPE_TA), inventory 
intensity (INV_TA), R&D intensity (RD_TA), net operating losses (NOL), foreign 
operations (foreign pretax income scaled by total assets, PTIFOR_TA), non-tax NAS 
(PCT_OTH_NAS), and uncertain tax benefits (natural log of UTB beginning balance, 
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 Note that Klassen et al. (2012) find a positive association between size (measured as the natural 
log of total assets) and internal return preparation (measured as an indicator variable). However, Mills et al. 
(1998) find a negative association between size (measured as the natural log of total sales) and investments 
in tax planning (measured as internal and external spend as a percentage of SG&A expense). These 
differences may be explained by the use of different measures for both the test and dependent variables. 
Mills et al. predict a negative relationship due to economies of scale associated with size.  As a firm’s size 
increases, investments in tax planning are spread over a larger base thereby resulting in a negative 
association.  Klassen et al. (2012), by contrast, look only at a yes or no decision to prepare a return 





LN_UTBB). With the exception of PCT_OTH_NAS, all of these variables are expected 
to be positively related to an ITF. Higher PCT_OTHNAS, however, may indicate a firm’s 
willingness to use external resources and would therefore be negatively related to ITF.  
I control for industry and year and add other firm characteristics that may be 
indicative of complexity. I therefore include SG&A expense (SGA), audit quality (BIG4), 
and acquisitions (ACQ) and predict a positive association between these factors and an 
ITF. I also consider the firm’s use of other expertise by including PCT_TAXNAS, 
CFO_TAX, OTH_EXEC_TAX, BODonly_TAX, AC_TAX, AC_LEGAL, and 
AC_ACCTG. Finally, to test for selection bias, I include BOOK_ETR. Since a CFO is 
typically charged with oversight of the tax function, I predict that a CFO with tax 
expertise will place a high value on this function and will choose to employ an internal 
tax department. For other variables, I do not predict a directional relationship due to 
limited prior research. 
Results of this analysis are presented in Table 20. A number of firm variables are 
significantly and positively associated with ITF at p < 0.01. These variables include 
LN_TA, PPE_TA, LN_UTBB, NOL, ROA_PTI , PTIFOR_TA, CFO_TAX and 
AC_ACCTG. BOOK_ETR is not statistically significantly related to ITF in this model. 
As such, there is no evidence to suggest that firms with certain levels of ETR are more 
likely to have an ITF. 
Since the selection bias tests may be affected by model specification (given there 
is no ITF model in the literature), and the presence of potential simultaneity between ITF 





Table 20. Logistic regression of ITF on BOOK_ETR and control variables 
ITF = f {LN_TA + PPE_TA + LEV + INV_TA + BIG4 + ACQ + RD_TA + LN_UTBB + NOL + 
SGA + ROA_PTI + PCT_OTHNAS + PCT_TAXNAS + OTH_EXEC_TAX + CFO_TAX + 
BODonly_TAX + PTIFOR_TA + BOOK_ETR + AC_ACCTG + AC_LEGAL + AC_TAX + 
INDUSTRY + YEAR} 

































































































































































 Year Dummy 
   
YES 
   Industry Dummy 
   
YES 
   Observations 
   
938 





*** Denotes significance at the 0.01 level. The direction of the tests are indicated by the predicted sign. 
         In addition to variables defined in Table 2, the above regression includes inventory scaled by total assets (INV_TA), log of 
 UTB beginning balance (LN_UTBB), ROA based on PTI (ROA_PTI), percent of other NAS purchases (PCT_OTHNAS), 
 BOD with tax expertise (BODonly_TAX), and foreign PTI scaled by total assets (FORPTI_TA).  
 
 






originally in Table 5. First, I estimate an ITF model
47
 and use the predicted values of ITF 
(PRED_ITF) from this model in the second stage regression. I substitute PRED_ITF for 
ITF in the original BOOK_ETR model presented in Table 5. The results for this 
regression are presented in Table 21. PRED_ITF is negative and significant in this model 
(p = 0.000), which indicates that the results are robust to potential biases and 
endogeneity.  
Finally, I conduct a lag analysis. For purposes of this analysis, I regress 
BOOK_ETR for the current year (year t) against prior year ITF and prior year control 
variables (year t-1). The reduced sample size of this regression leads to some industries 
being minimally represented. I therefore consolidate industry classifications following 
Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998). Results of this lag test are presented in Table 22. 
ITF remains negative and significant (p = 0.098) in this equation. In combination, these 
tests indicate that endogeneity and selection bias do not appear to be significant 
impediments with respect to interpreting the results of the analyses.
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 This model is similar to the ITF model presented in Table 20 but does not include BOOK_ETR 





Table 21. Regression of BOOK_ETR on PRED_ITF and control variables 
BOOK_ETR = f {PRED_ITF + AC_TAX + AC_LEGAL + AC_ACCTG + CFO_TAX + OTH_EXEC_TAX + ROA 
+ LN_TA + PPE_TA + CHG_SALES + LEV + SGA + CAPEX_PPE + NOL + FOREIGN + BIG4 + PCT_TAXNAS 
+ ACQ + BTM + RD_TA + INDUSTRY + YEAR} 





































































































































































 Year Dummy 
   
YES 
    Industry Dummy 
   
YES 
    Observations 
   
938 
    F-statistic 
   
6.131 *** 
   Adjusted R2     
 
0.260 
    *, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
   
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, two-tailed otherwise. 






Table 22. Regression of BOOK_ETRt on ITFt-1 and control variables 
BOOK_ETRt  = f {ITFt-1 + AC_TAXt-1  + AC_LEGALt-1  + AC_ACCTGt-1  + CFO_TAXt-1  + 
OTH_EXEC_TAXt-1  + ROAt-1  + LN_TAt-1  + PPE_TAt-1  + CHG_SALESt-1  + LEVt-1 + SGAt-1  + 
CAPEX_PPEt-1 + NOLt-1 + FOREIGNt-1 + BIG4t-1  + PCT_TAXNASt-1  + ACQt-1 + BTMt-1 + RD_TAt-1 + 
INDUSTRY + YEAR} 




















































































































































 Year Dummy 
   
YES 
    Industry Dummy 
   
YES 
    Observations 
   
981 
    F-statistic 
   
14.325 *** 
   Adjusted R2     
 
0.315 
             *, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
  
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign, two-tailed otherwise. 








CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Prior accounting and tax scandals have heightened concerns over corporate tax 
avoidance, and corporate executives’ tax strategy decisions are routinely scrutinized by 
public markets, regulators, and the media (e.g., Forelle & Bryan-Low, 2013; Linebaugh 
et al., 2013; Yadron et al., 2013). Audit committees and boards are taking a greater 
interest in tax strategy decisions as a result. In an effort to enhance our understanding of 
tax avoidance as a corporate outcome, this study examines how corporate tax avoidance 
may be influenced by the existence of an internal tax function and the background 
characteristics of that function’s leader. The study also examines the moderating effect of 
audit committee expertise on these relationships. By doing so, the study extends prior 
research on upper echelon theory, tax avoidance, and audit committees.  
The results reveal that firms with an internal tax function report statistically 
significantly lower book ETRs than those firms without an internal tax function. Firms 
with an ITF also report higher UTBs than those without an internal tax function. Thus a 
firm may justify the existence of this corporate administrative function through the 
resulting tax savings. Furthermore, I find that the negative relationship between an ITF 
and book ETR is particularly pronounced in firms that are smaller in size, less profitable, 
or operate in foreign jurisdictions.  
Through supplemental tests, I also identify interesting implications related to the 




firm experts contribute to lower ETRs. Specifically, the presence of an ITF, a CFO with 
tax expertise, and other executives with tax expertise lead to lower book ETRs, as does 
the presence of an accounting expert on the audit committee. The presence of a legal 
expert on the audit committee serves to curb tax avoidance in this scenario through a 
positive effect on ETR. 
When the auditor does provide tax services, none of the above expertise variables 
are significant. Together, these results suggest that auditor-provided tax services can help 
to neutralize any conservative tendencies of the audit committee legal expert or any 
aggressive tendencies of the other individuals involved (i.e., corporate executives, the 
ITF, or audit committee accounting and tax experts). If the audit firm is engaged in tax 
consulting, it can help to keep tax avoidance in check. Alternatively, these results may 
indicate that the ITF, company executives, and the audit committee are less involved in 
tax avoidance decisions because they have engaged the auditor for tax planning services.  
Additionally, under this scenario, I find that some firm control variables are 
negative and significant while not significant when the auditor does not provide tax 
services. Specifically, foreign operations and research and development are both 
significantly and negatively associated with book ETR when the auditor provides tax 
services. This result suggests that a firm is better able to capitalize on tax saving 
strategies associated with these complexities when it leverages the auditor for tax 
consulting services.  
In an analysis of the IHTE’s background characteristics, I find some limited 
evidence consistent with upper echelon theory. Specifically, IHTEs who are certified 





those who are not certified attorneys. This finding supports an assertion that individuals 
with legal training behave more conservatively in an effort to limit the firm’s exposure to 
legal liability. Educational background, years of experience, and gender of the IHTE 
were not related to a firm’s ETR.  
In supplemental analysis, I find that IHTEs with international tax experience and 
longer firm tenure are associated with lower book ETRs and therefore tend to engage in 
more tax avoidance than those IHTEs without international tax experience or those with 
shorter tenure. International tax experience exposes an IHTE to numerous complex tax 
issues and may improve an IHTE’s understanding of available tax saving strategies. 
Likewise, increased tenure exposes the IHTE to company-specific complexities and may 
improve an IHTE’s understanding of related tax saving opportunities.  
Additionally, I find that IHTEs previously employed by the auditor are associated 
with lower book ETRs when compared to those IHTEs that were not previously 
employed by their firm’s auditor. This finding may suggest that a level of comfort exists 
between the IHTE and auditor that enables the IHTE to take greater advantage of 
aggressive tax strategies without extensive restrictions or oversight being imposed by the 
auditor. Alternatively, these findings may suggest that an auditor alumni IHTE has 
improved access to expert resources within the audit firm and is better able to leverage 
these resources to maximize legitimate tax savings.  
This study is also one of the first to look specifically at the involvement of the 
audit committee in tax decisions by considering how the professional expertise of audit 
committee members may influence these decisions. Unlike prior research, this study 





expertise. The results reveal that audit committee members with accounting, tax, or legal 
expertise do exert different influences over corporate tax avoidance decisions.  
Specifically, the presence of an ITF does not contribute significantly to tax 
avoidance when a tax or accounting expert is present on the audit committee. However, 
in the presence of a tax expert on the audit committee, audit committee accounting 
expertise contributes positively to tax avoidance. Correspondingly, in the presence of an 
accounting expert on the audit committee, audit committee tax expertise contributes 
positively to tax avoidance. Thus, these audit committee experts tend to defer to each 
other with regard to tax avoidance decisions, rather than rely on the ITF.  
Certain IHTE characteristics, such as experience and education, become 
significant factors in tax avoidance decisions only in the presence of certain audit 
committee expertise. For example, IHTEs who possess either a MACC or MBA 
contribute positively to tax avoidance when audit committee members have legal 
expertise. IHTEs with an MBA are actually associated with higher book ETRs (lower tax 
avoidance) when a tax expert is present on the audit committee. More experienced IHTEs 
are associated with lower tax avoidance (i.e. higher ETRs) when a legal expert sits on the 
audit committee.  
Finally, while CERT_ATTY was positively and significantly associated with 
book ETR in primary tests, this relationship held only when an accounting expert was 
present on the audit committee. This certification did not contribute significantly to tax 
avoidance when audit committee tax expertise, audit committee legal expertise, or no 
audit committee expertise was present. Additionally, certification as a CPA was not a 





positively contributes to tax avoidance when a tax expert is present on the audit 
committee. Thus the combined background of audit committee members and the IHTE 
can influence tax avoidance decisions.  
Regression results were robust to a variety of sensitivity tests including 
supplemental analysis on various subsamples and on an alternative measure for tax 
avoidance, UTB_TA. Three critical additional tests are designed to evaluate selection 
bias and endogeneity. In combination, these tests indicate that endogeneity and selection 
bias are not significant concerns with respect to this analysis.
 
There are some potential limitations to the research presented here. First, as a 
result of the public data sources used, the sample consists of large, publicly traded 
companies that are domiciled in the U.S. Thus, findings from this research may not 
generalize to smaller companies, those that are privately held, or those that are domiciled 
in a foreign location. Future research should explore these areas.  
Second, my proxy for tax avoidance may not completely and accurately capture 
the corporate tax avoidance decision. I have used two measures, BOOK_ETR and 
UTB_TA, as proxies for tax avoidance to address this limitation. However, additional 
alternative measures have been used in other tax avoidance research. Future research 
should explore the relationship that an ITF and characteristics of the IHTE have to these 
other measures of tax avoidance, which include cash ETR, book-tax differences and 
alternative calculations related to uncertain tax benefits. 
Third, in employing upper echelon theory, I use observable characteristics such as 
experience, gender, certification, and education to indicate an individual’s perceptions 





decisions in past research. Thus, it is appropriate to use them in this particular context 
although they may be imperfect proxies for an individual’s tendencies in managerial 
decision-making.  
Finally, because of the use of secondary data to identify the primary variables of 
interest, there is a risk that some information may be incorrect or incomplete. For 
example, my search of publicly available data may find no record of an ITF for a firm 
when in fact an ITF exists. Biographical data for audit committee members and IHTEs 
may be incomplete as well. Furthermore, it may be difficult to identify and account for 
personnel changes that occur during a financial statement year. I have attempted to 
control for these issues through research design, particularly through the use of multiple 
data sources to better ensure the accuracy of ITF conclusions and IHTE designations. 
However, some issues may still exist. 
Despite the limitations, this research makes a number of important contributions 
to current literature. First, it provides descriptive information on the chief tax officer, or 
IHTE, and lays a foundation for future research on this individual. Second, it provides 
additional insight into the tax avoidance decision by helping us understand how the IHTE 
and other corporate decision-makers with tax and other expertise may work together in 
making tax decisions. In addition, the research provides perspective on the relationship 
triangle that includes the corporate tax function, the audit committee, and the audit firm.  
The information here can therefore be used to model a collective corporate decision-
making body in an effort to achieve desired tax avoidance behavior. With this research, a 
firm can understand how its primary and secondary decision-makers may work together 





aggressive tax decisions are not compatible with firm culture, firm leaders can alter this 
behavior through incentives or through alternative hiring and recruiting decisions. 
Similarly, regulators can utilize this research to obtain an improved understanding of 
corporate tax avoidance and tailor corporate governance requirements to meet their 
desired objectives. In sum, this information should prove useful to corporate boards, audit 
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